[DEV] Historical Content Representation - Pilot Projects

Panzer / Allied General Remake: Strategies, Tactics, Efiles, Custom Campaigns, Customizations, Documentation.

Moderator: Radoye

Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Lettos »

Radoye wrote: 2021-05-27 12:35, Thursday That is correct, canister was not much used in tank guns but rather in towed AT. Which makes sense, since tanks also have machine guns to defend from infantry and towed AT guns don't so they need some way to deal with those kinds of situations. Solid AT shot is not very useful, 37 - 57 mm HE shells are better but tend to be too small to be practical, so they gave them canister too.

The only tank gun that i'm aware of having a canister shot was the German short 75mm (as in early PzIV, StuGIII, SdKfz251/9, SdKfz234/3 and similar applications) although i found no information if and how often it was used.
All oddities must have a logical explanation. This seems to be the case with the strange non-use of buckshot.
Article in RU: https://military.wikireading.ru/54571 :
At the same time there were technical restrictions on the use of buckshot. It is known that it was strictly forbidden to fire buckshot from guns that had a muzzle brake, since the destruction of the case of buckshot during the firing occurred in the barrel's channel.

Similar restrictions were in effect in German artillery during World War II: only certain types of artillery guns were allowed to use buckshot for firing, such as 105-mm medium turret gun (t. 10 cm K.T.), medium casemate gun (t. 10 cm K.K.), 105-mm extended turret gun (lg. 10 cm K.T.), and 150-mm heavy turret howitzer (s.H.T.), whose ammunition included 105-mm and 150-mm cartridge rounds.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
I cannot comment the above mentioned list of guns. Let the experts sort it out in detail. But the logic of using cartridge charges is clear - there should be no muzzle brake, and for the effectiveness of the cartridge shot the caliber of the gun must be large enough (apparently, at least 75 mm or better more than 75 mm).
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Lettos »

Radoye wrote: 2021-05-27 12:35, Thursday That is correct, canister was not much used in tank guns but rather in towed AT. Which makes sense, since tanks also have machine guns to defend from infantry and towed AT guns don't so they need some way to deal with those kinds of situations. Solid AT shot is not very useful, 37 - 57 mm HE shells are better but tend to be too small to be practical, so they gave them canister too.

The only tank gun that i'm aware of having a canister shot was the German short 75mm (as in early PzIV, StuGIII, SdKfz251/9, SdKfz234/3 and similar applications) although i found no information if and how often it was used.
I came across information about cartridge charges in the Soviet artillery WW2.

An artilleryman, the commander of the battery wrote in his memoirs:
In 1943 old World War I cartridge ammunition was issued from depots for ZIS-3 guns.
The purpose was to self-protect the guns in forced combat at extremely short ranges.
We saw the approaching infantry of the Germans at a distance of one kilometer. The battery had almost no infantry cover. On his command they quickly removed the muzzle brakes. Buckshot direct fire. The attacking infantry at a distance of 100-200 meters was simply blown off the field.
User avatar
Radoye
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Posts: 472
Joined: 2019-09-30 11:21, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Radoye »

Lettos wrote: 2021-06-15 08:32, Tuesday I came across information about cartridge charges in the Soviet artillery WW2.

An artilleryman, the commander of the battery wrote in his memoirs:
In 1943 old World War I cartridge ammunition was issued from depots for ZIS-3 guns.
The purpose was to self-protect the guns in forced combat at extremely short ranges.
We saw the approaching infantry of the Germans at a distance of one kilometer. The battery had almost no infantry cover. On his command they quickly removed the muzzle brakes. Buckshot direct fire. The attacking infantry at a distance of 100-200 meters was simply blown off the field.
Yes, that's the scenario. Same for 37mm in USMC service on Guadalcanal during the 6 months of fighting against the Japanese there.

Especially around the Henderson Filed airbase where Japanese kept throwing wave after wave of infantry against it and canister ammo was used to great effect to stop them.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA600662.pdf

Image
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Lettos »

HexCode wrote: 2021-06-24 09:48, Thursday :howdy # Lettos #

Both # Radoye # and I are trying to support your custom content design desires and activities. However, the time may have come for you to decide what your "red lines" are going to be regarding historicity.

Up to this point in time, the following preliminary ideas and approaches have been put on the table:

Retrograde Kriegsspiel
Dynamic Kriegsspiel
HHD Engagements
HHD Mini-Campaigns
Doing "it" like # Radoye # :)
Deviating into geographical or force composition randomness
Contemplating doing your "thing" under wargames other than PGF

That's quite a list. :phew Would you care to reflect on the above and come up with a desirable direction which will allow these discussions to take place within the context of a sharper defined design concept space ? By the way, this topic is supposed to focus on scenario design scale and scaling issues. Are such issues still of active interest ? If not, any other design issues could easily be accommodated under your very own [DEV] topic. :)
I don't want to limit myself to any 'red lines' from now on and forever.
Everything changes over time.

1) The OoB already started should end at Moscow 1941. It's a classic SSI-style campaign, only with a completely non-typical outcome. And at the moment I have no desire to do other SSI-style Campaigns. Maybe some HHD Mini-Campaigns.
2) I have an interest in creating some individual scenarios from the 1942-1945 period to play in H2H mode only. Battalion or regiment scale. 1 hex = 2-4km. HHD Engagements.
3) Use 1) and 2) in working to understand the principles of "intelligent" AI.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical Content Design Plans

Post by Lettos »

HexCode wrote: 2021-06-25 20:21, Friday :howdy # Lettos #
Lettos wrote: 2021-06-25 09:08, FridayThe OoB already started should end at Moscow 1941. It's a classic SSI-style campaign, only with a completely non-typical outcome. And at the moment I have no desire to do other SSI-style Campaigns.
Perhaps # Radoye # may wish to offer some helpful feedback.
I hope so :). But so far, campaigns where all units are rendered useless in the last scenario have not been very popular :)
HexCode wrote: 2021-06-25 20:21, Friday
Lettos wrote: 2021-06-25 09:08, FridayI have an interest in creating some individual scenarios from the 1942-1945 period . . . Battalion or regiment scale. 1 hex = 2-4km. HHD Engagements.
Once that first Engagement is designed, this whole area can be fruitfully revisited. :)
I'm not planning any radical changes.
A lot of little things have accumulated.
1) Change in two strange scenarios Norway and Crete, which I have long wanted to either throw out altogether, or do in company-battalion scale, dividing the map by neutral hexes into several simultaneous battles in different landing sites, with the main core not landing at all and quietly updating and getting reinforcements in some remote Deployment hex.
2) In Poland-39 change the map to an improved map
3) In LC, change the composition of AUX and ALLIED units slightly
4) Perhaps I will redo the Balkans map to a larger map
HexCode wrote: 2021-06-25 20:21, Friday
Lettos wrote: 2021-06-25 09:08, FridayMaybe some HHD Mini-Campaigns.
Which presuppose the successful completion of one prototypical Engagement, right ?
Of course it is! :cool :howdy
HexCode wrote: 2021-06-25 20:21, Friday
Lettos wrote: 2021-06-25 09:08, Friday... to play in H2H mode only
Elsewhere in this forum, you wrote:
There is one problem with the H2H mode. We are too busy, and it is unlikely that we will be able to think about the next turn in the evenings for three weeks.
You can still play against yourself. Board wargamers used to do that all the time. The play mode can be described as "Auto-Hot-Seat".
Yes, I'm playing against myself (in Auto-Hot-Seat mode) for now. It's not 100% efficient in terms of quality, but it's very convenient in terms of my off-game time. The WAW Battle of Stalingrad, saved the morning before yesterday on turn 3, ended in my late-evening time yesterday. A completely unsatisfactory result, the defeat of AXIS on the Don River. That said, this result was well predictable from the game against AI. Allied are overrated at the beginning of Scenario, it was clearly visible in the game against the computer for both sides. In the game against myself (AHS) the same thing, as a result the river Volga AXIS did not even see. Was it worth wasting time on such a game in H2H mode? I think players' time in H2H mode should be spent on far more serious matters than simply adjusting PP by move during a scenario.
And in general, the AHS is a curious thing to do. For example, playing AHS with zero PP each turn is already many times more historical than the usual situation.
By the way, it is also interesting to play at Basic level with the same zero PP every turn. The AI is more adequate. Have you ever noticed that Fighter STR=4, or Tac Bomber STR=6 are almost complete units, both on the player side and the AI side? Try Basic and PP=0. :yes
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Dual-"Everything" Scenario Play ?

Post by Lettos »

HexCode wrote: 2021-06-25 23:25, Friday Simply put, SSI was supposed to be... infallible.
:cool :rofl
HexCode wrote: 2021-06-25 23:25, Friday So, yeah, I'm not a fan of dual-sided scenarios where the AI Module is viewed as interchangeable with a human player. There's player "shoehorning" and, then, there's player "shoehorning". The "Swiss Army Knife" approach to playing scenarios inevitably shortchanges play quality big time. :2cents
Absolutely! I am currently conducting some experiments, the results of which I am gradually posting in the AI thread.
So far, it looks like there's no way to get any kind of competitive AI behaviour in Offensive scenarios by any injection.
Defensively, the AI behaves much better. Sometimes I look at his actions and rejoice - that damn thing plays almost as well as I do in this and this fragment of the map! But this stupid devil, unfortunately, can't combine map fragments into his comprehensive overall strategic defense plan.

In general, my assessment of the AI's actions compared to the Player looks like this:
Offensive scenarios - 20-30% of all the cunning and intelligence of the Player
Defensive scenarios - 60-70%.
HexCode wrote: 2021-06-25 23:25, Friday Very much like yourself, I'm attracted to design situations where:

a) Prestige is in short supply.

b) Consequently, it's quite difficult to procure new units.

c) To this effect, a few in-game upgrades are both encouraged and counted on instead.

d) By the way, unit disbandment is prohibited (House Rule). :ihope
I approve! :cool

A small note about unit disbanding.
I played WAW and disbanded units in the first few scenarios. Sent an anti-aircraft unit home by Lufthansa business class, scrapped a Recon and transferred a unit to tanks.
But that was along the lines of "what is not forbidden is allowed". It was necessary to squeeze the maximum out of the available resources by playing the Campaign.
In real life, between October 1939 and May 1940 there was a very serious re-forming of German divisions. It is necessary to make an intermediate scenario and give the opportunity to disband something, somewhere to use cheat-code, make cavalrymen into tankers, etc.

But within one scenario - completely agree, there is no place for disbanding units. A disbanded infantry unit turns into a Fighter in one turn - that's ridiculous!
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Cost of weapons

Post by Lettos »

I searched on the internet how much the various German armaments cost during WW2.
I should say straight away that I wasn't interested in accuracy to the pfennig, just approximate figures. In order to understand in general what and how has already been done in dozens of Equipment files, and what and in which direction to change.
Prices are given in reichsmarks

Firearms

Mauser 98k - 56-70
Luger pistol - 26-32
MP-40 - 48-60
MG34 - 327
MG42 - 200

Mortars

50mm - 400
80mm - 810
100mm - 1500
120mm - 1200

Artillery

le.I.G 75mm - 6700
17 cm K i. Mrs. Laf. - 117000

Planes

Bf109 (no modification) (not equipped) - 60000
Bf109 with armament and equipment - 100000

Passenger cars

VW type 82 - 2782
VW type 166 - 4667

Half-trucks
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_S ... signations

Sd.Kfz.2 - 6000 (not exact data)
Sd.Kfz.6 - 30000
Sd.Kfz.7 - 36000
Sd.Kfz.8 - 46000
Sd.Kfz.9 - 60000
Sd.Kfz.10 - 15000
Sd.Kfz.11 - 22000

Recons

Sd.Kfz.222 - 20000
Sd.Kfz.231 - 53000

Armored personnel carriers

Sd.Kfz.250 - 20420
Sd.Kfz.251 - 22560

Tanks and Assault guns
(Unfortunately without specifying modifications)

PzII - 49300
PzIII - 96200
PzIV - 103500-116000
Panther - 130000
Tiger I - 260000
Tiger II - 321000

StugIII - 82500
38(t) base - 53000
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Cost of weapons - INF Battalion

Post by Lettos »

You can calculate how much it cost to form a battalion of Wehrmacht infantry.
The calculation is very rough. We need to understand at least the order of magnitude of the sum. The figures are taken from the upper, maximum limit.

700 men.

700 small arms = 50,000
60-70 machine guns = 22,000.
20-30 mortars = 25,000.

Antitank rifles, heavy machine guns, flamethrowers, later, phaustic cartridges = ???

Uniforms, gas masks, horses, wagons, radios, field kitchens, individual soldier items and more = ???

Food = ???
Ammunition, grenades = ???
For what period of time to calculate ???

Bottom line.
Let's say everything together costs 300,000. Maybe 400,000 or 500,000.

At division level, we have to calculate how much the artillery cost. But let's limit ourselves to a battalion for now.

Incidentally, it does not appear that a Wehrmacht battalion in 1944 would cost significantly more than in 1935. The Sturmgewehr44 is by no means a collector's hunting weapon after all, and is cheaper than a machine gun.

Now suppose the battalion is motorized and transferred to some sort of mechanized transport.

One truck costs about 10000 reichsmarks, unless of course it is a trophy truck from France. The battalion would need approximately 40-50 trucks. Very roughly that would amount to 500,000 marks.

If you put infantry on Sd.Kfz 251s at a cost of 22560 marks apiece, then counting the battalion's requirement of 50-60 armored personnel carriers, that would amount to 1,100,000 to 1,200,000 minimum.

Also, these trucks and armored personnel carriers constantly need spare parts and fuel! How much is that in Reichsmarks, compared to the hay from the peasant fields in the Slavic territories?


Total for unit cost with embedded transport:

Infantry Battalion 1935 = 1
Infantry battalion on trucks = 2-2.5
Battalion on armored personnel carriers = 3.5-5.0
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical info

Post by Lettos »

I came across a very interesting document on the Russian Internet about the state of the divisions of the Leningrad front in August 1941.
The text of the document is too real to be faked.

The document may be interesting to modders who have decided to do some kind of 1941-1942 war scenario on Eastern front. After all, looking at the map you might decide that there were real divisions there. In reality the document shows that these divisions are actually battalion groups, often without heavy weaponry.
I think you will find it interesting to look at!

I 've hand typed the text of this document.
Link to the document: http://fablewar.ru/2011/09/division/
There is no point in reading this article, just scroll to scanned document

If you feel comfortable, put the Russian text into the auto-translator. If you can read the document in its original form - all the more perfect!
The text in the scans contains errors and various outdated phrases, bureaucratic language and many abbreviations. I tweaked that a little bit in the typed text.

Some abbreviations explained in Document text with my comments marked as (*)

About guns:
ПА - "PA" = battalion/regiment ATY. Very probably it's field guns 76mm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/76_mm_reg ... _gun_M1927

ДА - DA = divisional ATY 76-152 mm.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/76_mm_div ... n_M1902/30
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/76_mm_div ... 936_(F-22)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/122_mm_howitzer_M1909/37
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/122_mm_howitzer_M1910/30
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/122_mm_ho ... 938_(M-30)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/152_mm_ho ... 37_(ML-20)

From the document it is impossible to know exactly how many guns of what caliber might have been available.
According to the staff schedule, the division was supposed to have about:
24 76mm guns and 16 122mm howitzers, both with horse transport
24 122mm howitzers, 12 152mm howitzers, both with mechanized transport

ПТО - "PTO" = ATG 45mm

ЗА - "ZA" = AD gun
Very probably 37mm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/37_mm_aut ... 939_(61-K)

Map showing these divisions on front
Image
Link to larger picture: https://postimg.cc/XG2Xz6Xr
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical info

Post by Lettos »

30 августа 1941 года
Начальнику штаба Главного командования Северо-Западного направления.

Представляю краткие характеристики дивизий, входящих в состав Ленинградского фронта.
Приложение: Упомянутое на 10 листах.

Подписи:
начальник штаба Ленинградского фронта полковник Городецкий
Военный комиссар штаба Ленинградского фронта, полковой комиссар Холостов


Краткая характеристика дивизий, входящих в 23 армию

198 мсд (* мсд - мотострелковая дивизия) - командир дивизии генерал-майор Крюков.
Дивизия в первые дни войны была в армейском резерве. Во время прорыва противника в районе Ристалахти, Кирконпуоли, 198 мсд была направлена для контратаки. В атаке успеха не имела. Дивизия показала свою небоеспособность и была отведена на станцию Тали, где занималась боевой подготовкой.
В первых числах июля дивизия была направлена на правый фланг армии, для решения частной наступательной задачи. Дивизия вновь показала свою низкую боеспособность. Решением Военного Совета 23 армии генерал-майор Крюков был отстранен от командования дивизией.

265 сд (* сд - стрелковая дивизия) - прибыв на фронт 23 армии для нанесения контр-удара по прорвавшемуся противнику, контр-удара не нанесла. 951 сп (* сп - стрелковый полк) из района Сайрала разбежался.
496 и 491 сп показали низкую боеспособность, особенно 496 сп. Сейчас дивизия выведена в армейский резерв, где проводит сбор своих частей и получая пополнения, пополняется.

142 сд показала хорошую боеспособность, особенно 466-й стрелковый полк.

115 сд подготовлена вполне удовлетворительно. Дралась с противником с большим упорством.

43 и 123 сд в первый месяц были в обороне, отбивали попытки противника прорваться через их фронт.
43 сд - Командование дивизии очень часто просило помощи (Командир дивизии имел паникерское настроение. Это по заключению командующего 23 армией)
123 сд - будучи назначенной для наступления, показала несплоченность дивизии. В результате части, подразделения дивизии были разделены и вышли из управления командира дивизии.

Подпись: Начальник направления 23-й армии майор Тутуров


Краткая характеристика
Боевого состояния дивизий 8 Армии и Копорской оперативной группы.

30 августа 1941 года

1. Дивизии входящие в состав 8 Армии

48 сд - 3-х полкового состава, при 3 орудиях ПА. После боев в Эстонии дивизия имеет численный состав в 1754 человек. Крепкая надежная дивизия, панике не поддается. Имеет опыт боев в окружении. Дивизия боеспособна.

125 сд - 3-х полкового состава при 1 орудии ПТО и 1 орудии ПА. После боев в Эстонии дивизия имеет численный состав в 2329 человек. Имелись случаи беспорядочного отхода. В последующих боях дивизия реабилитировала себя и является вполне боеспособной.

191 сд - 3-х полкового состава, при 30 орудиях ПТО, 34 орудия ПА, 23 орудия ДА и 18 орудий ЗА. Численный состав 8834 человек. Во время боев наблюдались случаи паникерства и беспорядочного отхода, чем и объясняется выведение ее в резерв командующим 8-й армией. При известной политработе среди красноармейцев и начальствующего состава, дивизия сможет выполнять любые поставленные боевые задачи.

11 сд - 3-х полкового состава при 2 орудиях ПТО, 6 орудиях ПА, 22 орудиях ДА и 2 орудиях ЗА. Численный состав 5868 чел. Одна из крепких дивизий 8 Армии. Имеет опыт боев с немцами в Эстонии. Паники и беспорядочного отхода не наблюдалось. Крепкая, хорошо сколоченная дивизия, оказывающая упорное сопротивление противнику и наносящая ему поражения.

118 сд - 2-х полкового состава при 1 орудии ПТО, 14 орудиях ПА, 3 орудиях ДА и 3 орудиях ЗА. Численный состав 3025 человек. Одна из слабых дивизий 8 армии. Случаи паникерства и беспорядочного отхода наблюдались в боях под Псковом, Гдовом, Раквере. В боях под Раквере 118 сд потеряла целиком 398 сп, не оказав ему содействия в завязавшемся бою. Командование дивизии сменялось и отстранялось несколько раз. Дивизия не боеспособна.

268 стрелковая дивизия - 3-х полкового состава при 9 орудиях ПА. Численный состав 4576 человек. Одна из лучших дивизий 8 армии. Случаи беспорядочного отхода наблюдались, но упорными боями с противником дивизия показала высокие боевые качества. Дивизия боеспособна.


Копорская оперативная группа

2 ДНО (* ДНО - Дивизия народного ополчения) - 4-х полкового состава, при 10 орудиях ПТО, 21 орудии ПА, 25 орудиях ДА. Численный состав 10246 чел. Укомплектована бойцами из народного ополчения. В ряде тяжелых боев дивизия показала стойкость и упорство, хотя в начале войны и были случаи беспорядочного отхода и паникерства. Одна из лучших дивизий Копорской оперативной группы.

281 сд - 3-х полкового состава при 8 орудиях ПТО, 11 орудиях ПА, 8 ДА. Численный состав 3893 чел. Сформирована недавно. Военная подготовка слабая. Были случаи паникерства и беспорядочного отхода, в результате чего в первых же боях дивизия 2/3 своих войск разбежалось (* - возможно, "растеряла") по лесам. Дивизия не вполне боеспособна. Требуется усиление ее кадрами командного начальствующего состава и усиленная политическая работа среди бойцов.

1 Гвардейская сд - 3-х полкового состава при 3 орудиях ПА и 3 орудиях ЗА. Численный состав 2409 чел. Сформирована из народного ополчения недавно. Боевая подготовка низкая. В первых же боях под Врудой дивизия разбежалсь по лесам, оставив на поле боя всего 500 человек. Дивизия доверия не заслуживает. Командование дивизии опыта в руководстве боем не имеет. Требуется усилить дивизию командным составом и провести большую политическую и боевую подготовку войск, чтобы ее вытянуть на уровень современных дивизий.

1 тд (* тд - танковая дивизия). При 8 орудиях ПТО, 11 орудиях ДА, 50 танках. Численный состав 4522 чел. Является основой и опорой Копорской оперативной группы. Это самое лучшее, самое надежное и самое сильное, что есть в боевых порядках войск генерал-майора Семашко. 1 тд - крепкая хорошо сколоченная дивизия, не раз громившая немцев в боях. При пополнении материальной частью 1 тд сможет выполнять любые танковые задачи.

ВПУ НКВД (* ВПУ - Высшее пограничное училище, т.е. курсанты-пограничники) При 4 орудиях ПТО, 8 орудиях ПА и 4 орудиях ЗА. Численный состав 1715 чел. Одна из сильных единиц Копорской оперативной группы. Хорошо сколочена и подготовлена к боям. Вполне боеспособна и является примером для многих по своим боевым качествам.

4 ДНО. После тяжелых боев под Сабском на Кингисеппском направлении 4 ДНО попала в окружение. Выходя из окружения потеряла всю материальную часть. Группируется в районе города Красногвардейска. Полностью не восстановлена, как единица не существует.

Подпись: Начальник управления подполковник Прохоров.


Краткая характеристика боевого состояния дивизий Красногвардейского укрепленного района, Южной оперативной группы и Оперативной группы товарища Лазарева

235 сд. В дивизии недостаточно артиллерийских и минометных средств. В боях под Лугой дивизия несмотря на неоднократные контр-атаки противника имела успехи. В бою устойчива.

177 сд - некомплект 20-25%. Дивизия вполне боеспособна. В боях упорна и к фронту уже привыкла. Имеет большой боевой опыт. До полутора месяцев упороно сдерживала до 3 дивизий немцев под Лугой, нанося им крупные потери.
Дивизию необходимо пополнить командующим составом, станковыми пулеметами и минометами.

111 сд - боеспособность дивизии на 50%, так как в личном составе, материальной части и вооружении некомплект доходит до 50%.
В боях не упорна, и только 468 стрелковый полк производит хорошее впечатление, не учитывая вооружения. Старого состава осталось до 20%, остальной состав из пополнения.

1 сп 3 ДНО. Укомплектован хорошо. По характеру действий, разведке и охранение, личный состав службу несет неплохо. Находясь на фронте в 40 км, при начавшемся выходе из боя под натиском противника не дрогнул и отходил строго по плану.

70 сд - дивизия была хорошо сколочена, хорошо укомплектована и вооружена. Боевые задачи выполняла четко, сражалась храбро в составе Лужской оперативной группы. В связи с нарушением управления под Шимск и под влиянием сильного авиационного воздействия противника, дивизия распылилась и едва было собрано до 4000 человек. В лучшую сторону из полков выделяется 329 сп. В настоящее время дивизия, кроме 329 сп, была рассеяна авиацией противника. 329 полк сумел сохранить основное ядро и остался боеспособным.

90 сд. Дивизия имеет отличные боевые традиции, особенно 19 сп, сохранивший и по сие время свою боеспособность. В боях в районе Сабск потеряв до 15-20% состава, дивизия неоднократно переходила в контр-атаки и мужественно отражала атаки противника.
Благодаря не достаточно твердого руководства и отсутствия средст управления при выходе в тыл противника с танками успеха не имела.
В настоящее время дивизия не полнокровна, имеет большой некомплект в личном составе и вооружении. Пример - полк 1000-1200 человек, при 2 станковых пулеметах и 4 орудиях.

1 ДНО. С прибытием на фронт была боеспособна, показывая хорошие результаты в первые дни боев. Принимала участие в отражении атак дивизии СС противника. После авиационного и минометного воздействия, в течение длительного времени при отсутствии управления со стороны дивизии по вине командования, дивизия была рассеяна и до сего времени собирается. Отдельные ее отряды на разных направлениях ведут бои. В настоящее время дивизия имеет некомплект. Желательно дивизию расформировать.

2 и 3 Гвардейские дивизии, полнокровные. В боевых сражениях участия не принимали. По характеру ведения разведки и охранения результаты неплохие. В коротком бою под Пижма части 2 Гвардейской сд проявили упорство и настойчивость. Некомплект в личном составе до 30%.

24 тд. Некомплект вооружения до 60%. Имеет большой боевой опыт. Несмотря на распыленность дивизии, это не помешало ей сохранить себя крепким ядром. Сложные задачи, выполняемые дивизией, имеют много примеров героизма. В целях сохранения кадров специалистов, дивизию вывести из боя и доукомплектовать материальной частью.

291 сд прибыла на фронт в конце июля. В целом дивизий может выполнять поставленную ей задачу.

Подпись: Начальник направления Торопин


Краткая характеристика дивизий, входящих в 48 армию

Все дивизии армии в момент передачи в подчинение Северного фронта находились в состоянии деморализации после прорыва противника под Новгородом.

311 сд передана была в количестве 2700 человек, почти без артиллерии (2 орудия 76мм), не выдерживает артиллерийского и минометного огня противника, особенно бомбежки авиации. Многие бойцы бегут бросая оружие. Зарегистрированы случаи самострелов. В данное время дивизия не боеспособна.

128 сд совершенно не отличается стойкостью, почти во всех боях части дивизии в панике отступали. В данное время дивизия имеет до 300 человек. Совершенно не боеспособна.

21 тд - не имеет ни одного танка. С момента перехода в подчинения Северного фронта действовала как стрелковое соединение, не имея ни артиллерии, ни станковых пулеметов. Упорство в боях проявляется не достаточно. Необходимо в целях сохранения кадров вывести дивизию в резерв для пополнения ее материальной частью и использованию по назначению.

151 сп НКВД. В боях под Чудово после сильной артиллерийской подготовки и авиационной бомбежки полк в беспорядке отходил на север. К 27.08.1941 полк имел около 150 человек. Полк не боеспособен.

Подпись: Начальник направления полковник Лукин.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Cost of weapons - INF Battalion

Post by Lettos »

Lettos wrote: 2021-06-29 20:34, Tuesday If you put infantry on Sd.Kfz 251s at a cost of 22560 marks apiece, then counting the battalion's requirement of 50-60 armored personnel carriers, that would amount to 1,100,000 to 1,200,000 minimum.

Also, these trucks and armored personnel carriers constantly need spare parts and fuel! How much is that in Reichsmarks, compared to the hay from the peasant fields in the Slavic territories?


Total for unit cost with embedded transport:

Infantry Battalion 1935 = 1
Infantry battalion on trucks = 2-2.5
Battalion on armored personnel carriers = 3.5-5.0
How many Sd.Kfz.251s were at the front in 1941? The answer is in the quote below.
Operation Barbarossa. Volume IIA – The German Forces, Mobilisation and War Economy: June to December 1941 (Part I) by Nigel Askey
Page 90.


The Sd Kfz 251 Ausf C (the predominant type used in Operation Barbarossa) incorporated improvements in the engine armour layout, the crew’s interior stowage and seating arrangements, the mudguard, and improved double doors at the rear to facilitate easier dismount. By June 1941 there were over 680 Sd Kfz 251s in service with Wehrmacht, and between 22nd June and 4th July 1941 around 590 were committed in support of Operation Barbarossa. These were predominantly allocated to the motorised infantry regiments in the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 17th, 18th and 20th Panzer Divisions. Contrary to popular belief however the majority of German infantry in panzer divisions was never ‘armoured’ during WWII, as were the Western Allied armoured divisions later in the war; and Operation Barbarossa was no exception. On 22nd June 1941 only the 1st and 10th Panzer Divisions fielded a full armoured infantry battalion (authorised 71 Sd Kfz 251s of all types), while most panzer divisions had only a single armoured infantry company with 16 Sd Kfz 251s each. It wasn’t until 1943 and the introduction of the Sd Kfz 251 Ausf D that real mass production started. The Ausf D incorporated a number of changes facilitating easier production, which jumped from 424 vehicles in 1941 to 4,258 vehicles in 1943. By war’s end a total of 15,252 Sd Kfz 251 of all types had been produced.
Only two battalions for all armored divisions on the Eastern Front in 1941!
2 x 71 = 142 Armoured Personal Carriers (APC).
12 companies, 12 x 16 = 192 APC.
The remaining 250 Sd.Kfz.251 were probably assigned to various other units.

Even on the battalion scale this armored personnel carrier in 1941 has the right to appear on the map in a maximum of only two units.
If you really want to, you can glue the rest of the companies on APC into battalions and artificially get 2-3 more units.
This is the reality.
User avatar
Radoye
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Posts: 472
Joined: 2019-09-30 11:21, Monday

Re: [DEV] Cost of weapons - INF Battalion

Post by Radoye »

Lettos wrote: 2021-06-29 20:34, Tuesday If you put infantry on Sd.Kfz 251s at a cost of 22560 marks apiece, then counting the battalion's requirement of 50-60 armored personnel carriers, that would amount to 1,100,000 to 1,200,000 minimum.
Just a quick note - "prestige" in SSI 5-star General games is IMHO not money and should not be looked at like that (monetary cost of producing and fielding an unit of a particular kind). It should rather represent the willingness of the high command to assign a particular piece of equipment to your command as opposed sending it to some other commander on the same or some other front. At least that's my understanding of it.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Cost of weapons - INF Battalion

Post by Lettos »

Radoye wrote: 2021-07-04 14:53, Sunday
Lettos wrote: 2021-06-29 20:34, Tuesday If you put infantry on Sd.Kfz 251s at a cost of 22560 marks apiece, then counting the battalion's requirement of 50-60 armored personnel carriers, that would amount to 1,100,000 to 1,200,000 minimum.
Just a quick note - "prestige" in SSI 5-star General games is IMHO not money and should not be looked at like that (monetary cost of producing and fielding an unit of a particular kind). It should rather represent the willingness of the high command to assign a particular piece of equipment to your command as opposed sending it to some other commander on the same or some other front. At least that's my understanding of it.
Let us assume that this is the case. It is even more likely that it is true.

So then what? A certain hero turns to the High Command - give my group of armies this and that, and more, I deserve. They say to him - alas, we don't have any.
War Journal of Franz Halder

5 December 1941
10:30. Phone talk with Field Marshal von Reichenau. He wants mobile Divs. We haven't got any. He gets tanks.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng7.pdf
Of the 92 APC Sd.Kfz.251 not on the Eastern Front in June 1941, 39 were sent to North Africa. The reserve for all theaters of war was 53 APCs.

The command would very much like to go along with the three-four marshals. And in July, and in September, and in December. But... take some tanks, since there is no other. :ihope :ihope :ihope

I don't want to think about what the marshal was answering to division commanders, distributing reinforcements of 100 tanks to five or seven tank divisions. And what the division commanders thought about such replacements. ;)

That is, you can want, you can have PP to support your requests, but... to get bogged down by the limitations of the economy.
Of course, if we have a war between Martians and Venusians in... 1000000 BC, everything will be possible.
It might be interesting in terms of what would happen if now, and if in advance, and if just yesterday and then tomorrow to do this and that.
I will also write a post about the bifurcation points between 1938 and 1943.
Not forgetting that in reality there were 590 APCs on the Eastern Front.
User avatar
Radoye
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Posts: 472
Joined: 2019-09-30 11:21, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Radoye »

Hey, we're not in a disagreement here. I was just pointing out that looking at the monetary price of a vehicle is a dead end. There have been attempts in the PG modding world to use real life monetary prices to set the prestige values for units in the eqp file but these didn't end well. Due to various reasons, you'd end up with a very unbalanced set of prestige values which make the game unplayable. The prestige price is thus best derived from the unit stats (the "better" the unit the more it costs).

Now - the problem of rarity: You could introduce "early" versions of the same thing with inflated prices, so that the historical availability is being met but still to prevent the player from purchasing too many and forcing them to use more historical choices. Then, at a later date when this piece of equipment becomes generally available you introduce the "regular" version with the normal price.

So in this example, an "early" SdKfz 251 would still have the same basic price as the normal one but with a rarity multiplier (whatever you think is appropriate, like 3x or 4x the price of the normal unit). You then make the "regular" unit available at the appropriate date, and expire the "early" one. The player can then upgrade their "early" SdKfz to "regular" (and save prestige on future replacements), or not. And they can purchase new ones at their normal price. :deal
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Lettos »

Radoye wrote: 2021-07-05 01:15, Monday Hey, we're not in a disagreement here. I was just pointing out that looking at the monetary price of a vehicle is a dead end. There have been attempts in the PG modding world to use real life monetary prices to set the prestige values for units in the eqp file but these didn't end well. Due to various reasons, you'd end up with a very unbalanced set of prestige values which make the game unplayable. The prestige price is thus best derived from the unit stats (the "better" the unit the more it costs).
I can imagine what one could do if one simply multiplied the cost of the Bf109 by the number of planes in the Jagdgeschwader.
I cannot be held responsible for people who acted so rashly and thus ruined a good idea.

A tank battalion is really a battalion of soldiers! Only some of them drive tanks, some of them drive tractors, and the rest just consume tank parts in insane quantities.
An aviation group of three squadrons is the same in terms of resource consumption.
So the cost should have been calculated as:
Tank Battalion = Infantry Battalion + cost of tanks + cost of other equipment + cost of spare parts + cost of fuel + cost of ammunition + cost of shipping tanks, fuel and spare parts somewhere near El Alamein or Vyazma.
Radoye wrote: 2021-07-05 01:15, Monday Now - the problem of rarity: You could introduce "early" versions of the same thing with inflated prices, so that the historical availability is being met but still to prevent the player from purchasing too many and forcing them to use more historical choices. Then, at a later date when this piece of equipment becomes generally available you introduce the "regular" version with the normal price.
I completely agree!
Radoye wrote: 2021-07-05 01:15, Monday So in this example, an "early" SdKfz 251 would still have the same basic price as the normal one but with a rarity multiplier (whatever you think is appropriate, like 3x or 4x the price of the normal unit). You then make the "regular" unit available at the appropriate date, and expire the "early" one. The player can then upgrade their "early" SdKfz to "regular" (and save prestige on future replacements), or not. And they can purchase new ones at their normal price. :deal
It goes something like this. But only by 1943-44.
In 1941-42, even if there had been an exchange of unfinished aircraft carriers for armored carriers, the armies at the front would still not have seen these very armored carriers immediately.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Dual-purpose units

Post by Lettos »

During the discussion of Dual-purpose units, there were questions about the AI's behavior: whether he will understand what he has at his disposal, how he will act if he understands, etc.

I made a test micro-scenario named TEST2.

Dual-purpose units fight against each other and against other units.

Allied unit: 76mm ATG (ZIS-3).
The main class is ATY.
Auxiliary class is a transport that acts as an ATG.
Axis unit: Flak 8.8
The basic class is AA.
Auxiliary class - ATG.

MA of dual-purpose units - as if the units already have a some kind of track or horse transport.

Now we are not talking about parameters. They are configurable. Now it's just a movie in three modes: Human Axis, Human Allied, AI vs AI.

Enjoy! :)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/17r7D-E ... sp=sharing

And please share your viewing impressions :)
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] C-B-D Levels

Post by Lettos »

The game at the company-battalion level, or less often at the division level, depends on a few contingencies.
I'm not saying anything is bad or good (for the game). Just an example for the e-commanders as it were.

Here's what we read: viewtopic.php?f=95&t=516#p10131

And there have been other times:

My grandfather, born in 1908, in September 1941, was in the Latvian Division (201st RKKA) that was being formed.
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/201-%D1%8 ... %B8%D1%8F)

The Wikipedia article has a lot of heroic words about taking different villages, which can be read with the help of the RU-EN auto-translator.

But here is a story told by my grandfather about one combat episode in December 1941, during the counter-offensive near Moscow.

Commanders come to the divison's fighters. The order from HQ is to attack those villages that are visible on the horizon somewhere in the distance.
And before the village there is a snow field like the one described in the link above about the village of Kukolki.
Attack without any artillery preparation, just "hurrah" and "go". Yes...
The soldiers in the division are not just any, but Latvian. It means that they haven't wiped their brains under the pressure of communist propaganda. Yes, they agree to fight for the Soviet power. But in a smart, homely way. We have already seen that to put 600 men on a snow field is stupidity. They were not fools and they understood that.

The soldiers of the Latvian division say to the officers (100% communists and ideologically dependent) - we will not go to this field, they will put us all there with machine guns. Call the Katyushas.
If the soldiers of some other regular division had said such things, they would have all been sent either to a punitive battalion, or at once to somewhere much farther away, em terrible Siberia.
But here was a different situation. The Latvians had to be preserved for the future USSR liberation of Latvia.
You probably won't be surprised by the fact that the corps command suddenly found the Katyushas.

As my grandfather told me: we were walking in the field, near the village there were dead Germans.And not a single shot from the German side!


Back to the PGF.
All battles of company-battalion, and rarely - divisional scale usually have an alternative solution. Which for various reasons didn't happen in reality. Someone at the level of colonel and general just didn't want to spoil relations with superiors, and for the sake of good relations with superiors and orders it was easier to lay dead on the battlefield a couple of thousand (a couple of tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands) of soldiers than to be honest.

The alternative solution could be of various kinds: strike with Katyushas, bombers; send a special forces platoon to attack at night; do not attack in a hopeless situation; retreat; outflank the enemy; and maybe even make a truce and peace.
These alternatives were rarely applied in practice.

Presenting the scenario:

"Do you want to play it smart". It will cost 1000 PP.
The player has spent 1000 PP.
Katyusha and IL-2 appear on the map and the player solves his problem, keeping his units.

The player has not spent 1000 PP.
Greatest brawl in history with 1000 dumb rats being killed by 100 smart cats.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Designated Unit History

Post by Lettos »

HexCode wrote: 2021-07-06 22:20, Tuesday Elsewhere in this forum

viewtopic.php?f=95&t=516#p10094

its Moderator outlined his conception of a HHD Campaign consisting of a number of sequentially playable Mini-Campaigns. His conception still amounts to a Kriegsspiel. However, within individual Engagements which are the necessary constituent components of any Mini-Campaign, he has allowed for play dynamism which invariably leads to historically counterfactual events. Because of this, he has also proposed a tough, "outcome reset" design approach the aim of which would be to render any Engagement's commencement HHD; some of the goings on in the immediately preceding Engagement be... damned. :)

Elsewhere in this forum, I wrote:
Depending on whether the "player" gets glorified or is just another "historical"... Joe (no, not that Georgian :P ), scarcity may apply to him (or not) by fully intentional design ! All this will be reflected, among other things, in the unit-related options actually available to him.
:evil :)

I believe that, within the context of envisaged HHD content design and play, "we" can fruitfully dispense with SSI-style role playing leading to human player... glorification. :ihope This leaves "us" with the "historical"... Joe ! :)

For the sake of argument, let's assume that the envisaged Campaign / Mini-Campaigns follow the historical path of some specifically designated division. Let's also assume that the Core will consist of the division's constituent components which will be represented by battalion / company size units on the map.

A key decision bifurcation emerges:

A) Does the designer pick some crack / illustrious division and apply historicity to the situation on the basis of perceived, exceptional factors ?

B) Does the designer pick some... nondescript division and apply historicity on the basis of some "average" or "typical" contemporary understanding of wartime "realities" ?

By the way, how is one supposed to model the inevitable divisional reorganizations / reassignments over time ?
What is already implemented in Open General is much better suited for company-battalion campaigns and scenarios than PGF. I love it!
The Support Fire artillery is nicely implemented. It doesn't need to be right behind the back of a friendly unit to conduct Indirect Support Fire.
The planes move beautifully, quite appropriately for company-battalion level!

Tried playing the "22 Infanterie Division Campaign".
Our hobby colleague Dennis Felling solved literally the same problems you wrote about.
The scenario briefings have home rule instructions on what a player can and can't do. That's a very sound approach!

I'll be honest about my impressions of the first two scenarios. Boring.
And this is by no means the fault of the campaign author!
You can't make an interesting campaign for an infantry division, because the actions of an infantry division for several years consisted of the same set of actions:
artillery preparation, attack
defense + support fire

If we give the core a variety of AUX units, the scenario becomes interesting, but... cynically cruel. No pity at all for these AUX units. Why care about them in the long run? Make the most of them and throw them away!

The actions of the "fire" tank division are much more promising in terms of game interest.

Going back to the 22 Infanterie Division campaign. I won the first scenario right away with a regular victory, and I didn't even finish the second one because I would have lost.
The reason for losing is quite strange.

I can't see the units on the map in OG. My eyesight is fine, sometimes I use weak glasses to look at small letters. With the resolution of the monitor, too. But even with glasses I see mush on the screen, which prevents me from thinking about the game. All my efforts are spent not on thinking, but on trying to find a unit on the map and see its parameters.
The bomber flew up to Fuel=0, some of my fighters I never saw and forgot to move. Infantry was hard to find among the houses and the landscape.
Obviously, the problem is buried somewhere in my head.
But it is there, and it can hardly be solved by using different glasses and a different monitor.

But I really want to see how the following scenarios are implemented in this campaign by author Dennis Felling.
Oh, I'll have to torture both my eyesight and my sciatic nerve.

That's the intermediate conclusion for now. The only combination that satisfies me visually and ergonomically are the maps from PG1/PGF combined with OG units.

I've started to learn how to transfer the maps to OG. It seems to work, but there are a lot of minor technical issues with the OpenSuite interface. It doesn't go easily. The only thing that is inspiring is that this map migration is possible de facto.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] INF units. Machine guns.

Post by Lettos »

The subject of comparing infantry units of different armies does not seem to be very difficult at first glance. It would seem that it is not very difficult at first glance to compare infantry divisions of different armies.

For example, here are Comparative Strengths of British, American and German Infantry Divisions
https://ccnmtl.columbia.edu/services/dr ... h_new.html

List of World War II infantry weapons:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_W ... ry_weapons

It seems, that it remains to compare tactical and technical data of weapons, and to get very precise answers to typical questions of internet users:
Who has the best machine gun in WW2?
What was the best machine gun?
There are thousands of articles about machine guns. A thousand opinions.

I, too, have my own opinion, number 1001.

The best machine gun is the one that has the right amount of ammunition on the battlefield at the right time.

The article https://rostislavddd.livejournal.com/279899.html provides very interesting information on the organization of machine guns fire of an infantry platoon and squad of the Wehrmacht. The article is in Russian. I will cite some data from this article, which makes it possible to look at the division comparison tables from a slightly different perspective.

Each INF squad of the platoon in Wehrmacht had a
Machine-gun crew of three men:

The gunner (first number, Oberstreiter category) - armed with a pistol and an MG.34 machine gun with a part of the spare, loaded with 50 rounds of ammunition in a "Gurttrommel 34" tin box, or alternatively with a 75 round "Patronentrommel 34" magazine attached. Which, by the way, are constantly confused with each other. I must point out again: "Gurttrommel 34" was a cartridge case for 50 rounds, "Patronentrommel 34" was a magazine. The magazines required modification of the receiver cover, and, like the Patronentrommel themselves, have not been produced since 1940. Third variant was to use MG.34 loaded with 100 rounds (97 to be exact) from the "Patronenkasten 34/41" magazine strip, or with 50 rounds of it, in both cases without any magazine. The tape was wrapped around the machine gun as in the American movie "Platoon", dropping it before firing. Also, in the field, the first numbers usually cosplayed revolutionary sailors by wrapping a hundred, or hanging on themselves a bag with two shells gurttrommel, so as not to depend on the presence of a second number nearby (and this option I think was the right one, and the American scouts another mistake).

The machine-gunner's assistant (second number), armed with one pistol (he received the MP in the middle of the war), was supposed to carry the rest of the ammunition (barrels), four unloaded guttrommels and a big "Patronenkasten 34/41" cartridge box, which contained 296 small mortars, in two, 200 (197) and 100 (97) cartridge strips. Realistically, already in the 1941 photo, the faces glimpsed next to the machine guns are massively using single 300 cartridge boxes. The reasons - loss or grimace of kitting, in this case is unclear. There are mistakes in "THE GERMAN SQUAD IN COMBAT..." quoted by everyone involved in the Internet, for example the third machine gun number there is not armed with a rifle.

The third number of the machine-gun crew, an ammunition loader, carried, in addition to his armament and equipment, two more ammunition racks, which brought the standard stock of ammunition of the machine-gun crew alone to the fantastic figure of 1,238 (1,250) pieces, and with field perversions to 1,500 or more. Why fantastic? The machine-gun crew of the Red Army's DP-28, which had a rifle, a hand-held machine gun and six 47-round magazines for it. There were only 282 rounds in them. Less than one cartridge magazine of the Wehrmacht squad, of which there were three to four pieces. In the field reality the German advantage was even higher, as supply of machine gun magazines (including shells) was not a problem for Germany, but for machine gunners of the Western Front of the USSR in the spring of 1944 was a huge problem not only with the dead weight of magazines (which were twice as much as the rounds they contained) but also with their very existence. "The divisions went into battle half-armed: automatic weapons were few, machine guns each division had from 16 to 30 pieces, one magazine each for manual machine guns and automatic rifles". Which is not surprising - any jamming of the disk magazine, no matter by a fragment, or by a blow of a heavy object, made it unusable. It was usually just thrown away.

The Germans, with their idea of fire superiority, did not limit the carrying of cartridges to a machine gun to one squad. All riflemen of the squad, including the squad leader and the senior rifleman (deputy squad leader) could carry 100-200 cartridges for the machine gun - there were six of them. Each of them was armed with a Kar.98 carbine.

Thus a 1941 Red Army squad of 11 men theoretically had:

Ranged weapons (500-800 meters):
1 x DP-27 light machine gun https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Degtyaryov_machine_gun , ammunition 6 disks x 47 rounds = 282 rounds
8 x SVT-40 automatic rifles https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SVT-40 , maximum ammunition 60 rounds. Ammunition = 8 x 60 = 480
Automatic rifles were in short supply, a Mosin rifle https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mosin%E2%80%93Nagant with the same ammunition was used as a replacement.

Weapons of close range (300 meters)
2 x PPSh-41 machine guns https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PPSh-41 , ammunition 2 x 3 disks x 72 rounds = 432 rounds

762 + 432 = 1194 rounds

Schutzen squad of Wehrmacht 1941, 10 men:
1 x MG-34. Ammunition minimum 1238 rounds. Fire range up to 1000 m.
1 x MP-38/40. Ammunition = 6 x 32-40 = 200 rounds. For short distances up to 200-250 m only.
7 rifles, Ammunition = 480 rounds

1238 + 480 + 200 = 1918 rounds

Of course, there are additional factors as well:
- The use of trophy Soviet assault rifles by Wehrmacht soldiers. The PPSh was a very desirable trophy.
- supply of ammunition during combat
- MG-34 machine gun failure immediately made the German squad very weak.
- Number of hand grenades in the compartment
- In hand-to-hand combat 11 men are stronger than ten. Two machine guns against one reinforced this advantage.


Therefore it is hardly necessary to consider that in 1941 the Wehrmacht infantry squad is 1900/1200 = 1.6 times stronger than the Red Army infantry squad.

But, after reading this, are you still convinced that the Soft Attack parameter of the Wehr39 and ST Infantry units should be the same, "6"?

In the case of comparing separate squads, I would reduce this "6" ST INF to "5" or even maybe "4".
Or slightly different: Wehr39 SA=7, ST Inf SA=5.

And it becomes quite interesting for the game model when the same Wehrmacht squad rides out on the battlefield with an enemy infantry squad on a Sd.Kfz.251. That + another MG-34/42 machine gun and at least 1000 more rounds of ammunition. :huh

For an objective picture it would be very useful to have data on the ammunition of shooters in other armies of the world. I do not have such data yet. If anyone has them, please share them!
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] ATY Calculator (1)

Post by Lettos »

When parameterizing ATY and ATG units, questions arise:
- how many real guns should be in a unit?
- The number of guns determines the unit's SA and HA. Do I have to manually recalculate it every time?
- How do the parameters SA and HA of guns of different calibers correlate, taking into account the different number of shells that the gun had in its ammunition for each day?

I made a simple calculator to do the calculations.
It looks like this:

Image

Download link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1g9M3AU ... sp=sharing

You can enter different numbers of guns in a unit and see how much the SA and HA parameters change.

I took the data on daily ammunition sets from the 1941 and 1944 standards of the Red Army. Naturally these norms for different armies, although approximately similar, differed. So the number of shells is a field of research for each equipment file designer.

And you can see in this file that I'm a little ... objectively poked fun at the standard equipment file of the classic PG campaign. Look at the parameters of the SA and HA ATY guns 75, 105, 150mm. Don't those numbers sound familiar to you? And, for example, ATG 88mm HA=18? Hasn't that value come up before? ;) :)

That is, with the help of this calculator it was quite unexpectedly possible to unravel the scale that SSI used in determining the historical analog of the ratio of units of different calibers.
Ratio, but not the size of the unit itself, expressed in guns.

We solve this problem quite simply with math, geometry, and Battalion Scale.

In the continuation will be about number of guns, their AMMO and what should be the parameters SA and HA, depending on the selected hex scale and time value of turn.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] ATY Calculator (2)

Post by Lettos »

ATY Calculator Part 1: viewtopic.php?f=95&p=10603#p10603

Let's see what The impact of a high-explosive fragmentation projectile is in math and geometry.

Info source in RU:
http://armor.kiev.ua/wiki/index.php?tit ... 0%B4%D0%B0
Below we discuss some aspects of the high-explosive effects of a fragmentation shell using the example of an OF-530 fragmentation grenade fired from a 1943 152-mm howitzer. (D-1) at full load, giving it an initial velocity of 508 m/s. This ammunition has a mass of 40.0 kg and is loaded with 5.83 kg of explosive material (TNT or ammotol) ...

That is, the zero degree of shockwave damage during an air burst of an OF-530 grenade begins (taking into account errors and assumptions) from a distance of 15-20 meters from the point of its explosion.

If we project on the earth's surface the points of impact of fragments from the grenade rupture on the ground or at a low altitude of about a couple of tens of meters, they will represent an irregularly point-filled ellipse-like figure with dimensions about 70 m along the front and 30 m in depth with the gravitation of the densest grouping to the middle part of the figure.

It has been established by experience that big fragments of an OF-530 grenade near the place of its burst (distance of up to 30 m) are able to pierce homogeneous rolled armor up to 20 mm thick, and individual protection means - helmets, cuirasses and body armor - save from small and in some cases medium ones (flying out, tangential impact). Again, the irregular shape of a fragment compared to a bullet of the same mass and kinetic energy leads to a lower chance of penetration. But (barring expansive bullets and bullets that "tumble" when hitting the target) if the defense fails or is absent, the wound caused by a fragments will be much more serious than a bullet hit.

Translated with DEEPL
So, the kill zone of one projectile is an ellipse of 30*70 meters, i.e. 2,000 square meters.

By the way, we should note that the high-explosive effect even of a 150 mm projectile on armored targets is extremely weak. 20 mm armor is a Pz.II/PzIIIE level tank, not better. But SSI 15cm guns can be successfully used against PzIVD... check it out for yourself if you don't believe me :). The HA parameter for the ATY is overestimated.

Back to the kill zone.
The battalion defense area covers up to 2 km on the front and 1.5-2 km in depth and consists of company defense areas.
Red Army Infantry Combat Manual. 1942
http://militera.lib.ru/regulations/russ ... index.html (RU)
That is approximately 3-4 square kilometers. Or 3-4 hexes on a battalion scale. One hex occupies the infantry battalion itself in two or three lines of defense, one hex for battalion ATY, one hex for mortars, and one hex for ATG. Everything is fine!

Let's place 700 soldier dummies on that square kilometer. No need for any fortifications. Just stand at full height. It would take at least 500 rounds to destroy these dummies with fragments or a blast wave.
(One square kilometer = 1,000,000 = 500 * 2000 sq.m.)
In reality, more projectiles would be needed because they would not fall perfectly evenly over the entire area.

In the Red Army, the 150 mm gun ammunition was 60 rounds per day (see in "Calculator"). We will talk about the German Army a little later. For now just believe that no one in the German Army shot thousands of shells a day from a single 150mm gun either.

500 / 60 = 8 150mm guns will destroy Battalion of Dummies during 20 minutes but spending daily AMMO set.

Check it out in the sandbox.

Unit ATY 150mm according to the calculator = 6 guns. I.e. on the second turn there should be nothing left of the dummies.
20 ATY 150 mm units (HA=19) shoot 20 units of Wehr'39 dummies, STR=10, ENT=0.
Of the STR=200 after the second salvo remains STR=25. Almost fatal "Zero".

SSI knew military geometry and military math very well... Fine again!

But about how SSI managed to turn a rather quiet war into an incredibly violent strategy game, in the next post.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] ATY Calculator (3)

Post by Lettos »

Part 1: viewtopic.php?f=95&t=467&start=150#p10603
Part 2: viewtopic.php?f=95&t=467&start=150#p10604

So, in two salvos/turns the ATY 150mm destroys one infantry unit. The calculation is that one day's worth of ammunition is spent destroying dummies.

How many times will an ATY unit fire per game scenario? An advancing army will likely average ATY firing once in two turns. On the defending army, given Indirect Fire Support, the ATY unit will fire more than once per turn. There is an old PG1 scenario from SSI, Kiev. There are three 152mm ATY units in Kiev. In H2H mode, these ATY units do not give any chance to the attacker.
1 shot in 1-2 turns.... On a divisional scale, 1 turn = 1 day, things seem to make a lot of sense. 1 day's worth of ammo is spent in 2 days.
But on battalion scale, 1 day is divided into 8 rotations of two hours each. Firing 4-8 or even significantly more(!) ammo in a day? How wonderful for the player that there are no logistics in the game! You can kill dummies by the millions!

In SSI Universe...

Daily ammo is brought in by hundreds of trains and thousands of trucks. Artillerymen haul 40-kg shells to the guns without fatigue. The barrels of the guns have an eternal unlimited life span. All targets irrespective of the range of fire are always visible. Accuracy of fire is the same at any distance. No correction of fire from the air is required. And anyway, what the hell is this, a fire-correcting aircraft?
Is anyone trying to think that there should be an Air-Unit on the map, the placement of which over the target will greatly increase the accuracy of fire? :shock :bonk :D


In fact...

Let's get an HQ employee to help. No, not yet Franz Halder, but his adjutant Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, who in his famous book "Das Heer 1933-1945; Entwicklung des organisatorischen Aufbaues" reports such information about the ammunition consumption of the Low Countries & France campaign:

81mm mortars = 459,000
Light Infantry guns 75mm = 381,000
Heavy infantry guns 150mm = 82,000
Light Field Howitzer 105mm = 1,463,000
Heavy Field Howitzer 150mm = 640,000
100 mm guns = 249,000
210 mm Mortars = 15,800

Mueller-Hillebrand also reports that the Wehrmacht had a total of guns on 01.04.1940:

81mm mortars = 6796
Light Infantry guns 75mm = 3327
Heavy infantry guns 150mm = 465
Light Field Howitzer 105mm = 5381
Heavy Field Howitzer 150mm = 2330
100mm guns = no data
210 mm Mortars = 124
* About 100 mm guns the data are not hard to find on the Internet. Approximately 700 guns.

Suppose the Wehrmacht used 80% of the total number of guns in the 1940 Western Campaign. Well, not half, and not 100%?

Ammunition consumption per gun:

81mm mortars = 84
Light infantry guns 75mm = 143
Heavy infantry guns 150mm = 220
Light Field Howitzer 105mm = 340
Heavy Field Howitzers 150mm = 343
100mm cannons = 443
Mortars 210mm = 159

And now a final calculation of how much daily ammunition was expended by Wehrmacht artillery during the 40 days of the campaign. I will take Soviet 1941 daily ammunition rates (numbers in parentheses after the gun type).

81mm (120) mortars = 0.7
Light infantry guns 75mm (140) = 1
Heavy infantry guns 150mm (60) = 3.7
Light Field Howitzers 105mm (80) = 4.25
Heavy Field Howitzers 150mm (60) = 5.7
100mm Cannons (80) = 5.5
Mortars 210mm (40) = 4

To be sure that Mueller-Hillebrand did not mix up the numbers, we can see from the entry in the War Journal of his superior, the Franz Halder we already know. The entry was made about another campaign - against the USSR in 1941.
18 August 1941 (58th Day)
Gen.Brand (Arty):
........
4) Ammunition expenditure by our Artillery in this campaign: Total todate: 3-4 issues.
........
Volume 7. http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng7.pdf
In the 1940 campaign 4-5 day's ammunition sets in 40 days, in 1941 3-4 day's ammunition sets in 58 days...

I am struck by the SSI model, in which the artillery has been transformed from a "god of war"... into a super-violent mega-monster.
This monster must be adjusted when creating divisional scale scenarios, 1 turn = 1 day.
And this monster, as it exists now, should not be released on the game map at all at battalion scale. A radical reworking of ATY parameters is required: AMMO, SA, HA.
And adjustment of Ground Defense parameters of all Ground units.

In the next posts I will talk about those changes to the parameters that are possible to do.
I will also give some logistical calculations explaining why ATY did not and physically could not have one combat kit not only for each day, but often even for a week.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] ATY Calculator (4)

Post by Lettos »

Part 1: viewtopic.php?f=95&t=467&start=150#p10603
Part 2: viewtopic.php?f=95&t=467&start=150#p10604
Part 3: viewtopic.php?f=95&t=467&start=150#p10623

Part 4. About what doesn't exist in the SSI Universe: Production and Logistics

Two sources are used:
1. Müller-Hillebrand B. Das Heer 1933-1945. Entwicklung des organisatorischen Aufbaues. Bd. I-III. - Darmstadt; Frankfurt am Main: Mittler, 1954-1969.
2. War Journal of Franz Halder.

Mueller-Gillebrand's book has long been a bibliographical rarity. I am using the recently published Russian edition,
OCR: http://prussia.online/Data/Book/su/suho ... %20OCR.pdf
DJVU: http://prussia.online/Data/Book/su/suho ... -1945.djvu

Fortunately for readers, the text in the tables is translated by DEEPL very correctly :)
Let's open the PDF, page 277 on file. This is the ammunition consumption for each month for each caliber of gun.
The table on page 276 contains data on Wehrmacht artillery availability as of 01.06.1940.
Not all of this artillery was on the Eastern Front. Exactly how much is unknown. Roughly we can assume that not less than 2/3 of the total number. Maybe 80%, maybe even 60%. Let it be 2/3.

For example, I found this data on the availability of artillery on the Eastern Front at the beginning of Barbarossa:
50mm Mort = 10381
81mm Mort = 6700
37mm ATG = 8118
50mm ATG = 812
75mm Gun = 2744
100mm = 4725
150mm = 2700
210mm and more = 350

Comparing with the total number of guns in the Wehrmacht, for different calibers the coefficient ranges from 0.6 to 0.85

The simplest action for each caliber:
(Sum of ammunition consumption over 12 months / Day's ammunition worth) / (0.67 * Number of guns) = Number of day's ammunition expended over the year

If you do this, you can see that 30-45 daily ammunition sets were spent per year by a particular caliber gun.
At the same time, on average, half as much was produced as was spent. The Wehrmacht intensively used the stocks created between June 1940 and June 1941.

Now the logistics.

The Russian edition of the War Journal of Franz Halder contains notes made by the German publisher when the diary was published. Here is one note that gives a better understanding of what full ammunition is.
July 27, 1941
Note 363
A full ammunition set assumes the amount of ammunition, food, and fuel and lubricants that troops (divisions) carry with them for independent operational missions. A full ammunition supply is designed to sustain troops for 5-6 days of combat operations. The physical volume of such a supply depends on the organization of the unit as well as the provision of combat vehicles and logistics transports (rear service).

While food requirements for 6 days remain constant for a given formation, the consumption of fuel and ammunition varies depending on the nature of operations. When enemy resistance is strong, the consumption of ammunition increases and the need for fuel and lubricants decreases, and conversely, when the enemy is in pursuit, the need for them increases.

The ammunition supply was calculated on the basis of all available weapons. Normally, the troops had to constantly carry a full reserve of ammunition (500 tons per infantry division) and a full reserve of fuel (per 100 km). However, given the poor state of the roads in Russia, the fuel for 100 km was only enough for 70 km. For an infantry division for 100 km it was prescribed to have 25 cubic meters, and for a tank division - 150-200 cubic meters of fuel and lubricants.

The daily requirement of foodstuffs depended on the number of men and horses. For the infantry division the daily requirement was estimated at 45 tons. (These data were reported to the publisher by retired Major General Kollenberg on 4.1.1964) - Note of the German publisher.

Translated by DEEPL
We know the number of guns, ATGs, and mortars in an infantry division. We know the number of rifles and machine guns. We know the number of shells and ammunition in a day's supply of ammunition. We know the weight of shells and ammunition.

By simple multiplication we see that:
Weight of all shells in one ammunition kit = 140 tons
Weight of all ammunition, grenades = 30 tons
+ we have to add the weight of wooden and metal boxes, machine gun belts, packages etc...
We have weight at least 200 tons for one day ammo set.

And in the quote above, the Major General is talking about a figure of 500 tons. This means that an infantry division was carrying two daily ammunition sets in trucks, and the third was with the soldiers and directly near the guns.
3 ATY and ATG ammo sets "for 5-6 days of combat operations"

It does not appear that it was artillery in the Wehrmacht division that was the primary means of destroying the enemy ...
By the way, even in the Soviet Army Artillery was formidably called "God of War," but infantry was called "Queen of the Fields".

Shooting guns is the problem of carrying a huge weight of shells.
You can hit a single dummy firing a 40-kg shell from a 150mm howitzer, or you can hit it with a bullet from a single 20-gram round. You can just run over the dummy with the track, wasting some fuel for the tank. And then there's the inexpensive grenade, and the almost worthless bayonet .

In the next part, a little bit about finances in the artillery.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] ATY Calculator (5)

Post by Lettos »

Parts 1-4 are above this post.

Finances in ATY (and ideas about Ground units costs in PP)

Just for info:
https://rg.ru/2020/06/05/rodina-prodolz ... vojny.html (RU)

There was a branch of military production that absorbed the resources of the state by a wide margin from all others. This was ammunition production. Of the 60 billion rubles ordered by the Red Army in 1941, 21 billion rubles (35.4%) were allocated for ammunition. Artillery systems were ordered for a much smaller amount of 3 billion rubles. Rearmament for new KV and T-34 tanks was to cost 7.9 billion rubles, rearmament of the Air Force - 11 billion rubles.

How much does artillery cost?

What does it cost? Where do such large sums come from? It has to do with the principles of using artillery firing from closed positions. Thus, it would take one hour to destroy a bunker or a fortified observation post using 100 to 120 shells of 122 mm caliber or 60 to 80 shells of 152 mm caliber, taking into consideration the natural scattering. Such consumption per one target gave considerable total consumption of guns during the months and years of combat operations.

In April 1941 the standards of the annual consumption of shells for the divisional guns were introduced - 6000 pieces for one 76.2-mm division gun, 4860 - 5280 for a 122-mm howitzer and 4320 for a 152-mm howitzer. In the pre-war prices these guns cost 80 to 100 thousand rubles, and a yearly rate of 76.2 mm shells would cost 418,000 rubles, 122 mm howitzer shells - about a million, 152 mm howitzer shells - 1.3 million rubles (We are talking about the shells, i.e. shells and charges for howitzers with their separate charging and unitary shells for 76 mm guns. For the calculations we used the cost figures of the rounds from the so-called "Price Book of GAU" (Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army) of July 1941).

As you can see, during its life at the front the artillery system shot ammunition at a cost many times greater, and in reality an order of magnitude greater, than the price of the gun itself.

The more serious and long-range guns were more expensive. The 152 mm ML-20 howitzer gun of 1937 cost in 1939 about 200,000 rubles, and the annual rate of shells for it (4,800 pieces) in the prices of the summer of 1941 - about 1.7 million rubles. There were 3123 such guns in the Red Army by the beginning of the war.

By the way, there was a non-linear dependence of the price of annual shot rate on the caliber. 1920 shells for one 203 mm B-4 howitzer of 1931 cost about the same 1.7 million rubles. As for the calibers of special power, this was followed by a sharp jump upwards.

Even the local conflict on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939 illustrates the scale of spending on ammunition. Victory at Khalkhin-Gol was assured in no small part by artillery, which won the duel against the Japanese. During the Soviet offensive from August 20 to 30, 1939, more than 32 million rubles worth of ammunition was expended2. In the same period (44 of them3) the irretrievable losses of rather expensive (112 thousand rubles) BT-7 tanks cost about 5 million rubles. During the Soviet-Finnish war (1939-1940) the breakthrough of "Mannerheim line" on the Karelian Isthmus costed more than 500 million rubles for the ammunition with the caliber from 107 mm to 280 mm. The loss of 368 tanks on the Karelian Isthmus cost the USSR an order of magnitude less (*i.e. 10 times less).

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
In 1940, one U.S. dollar = 5.8 Soviet rubles

Here is the data on U.S. military expenditures in 1941-45 in dollars of that period.
Outlays for national defense surged from $6.4 billion for FY1941, to $25.7 billion for FY1942, and to $66.7 billion for FY1943; defense outlays peaked at $83 billion for FY1945 before dropping markedly in postwar years.
Large-caliber artillery fire was very expensive. It is in the finances and production capacity of industry that the main reasons for such a limited daily ammunition supply of guns are found.
Finance -> Production -> Logistics to the Front.

Of the five major belligerent countries in World War II, perhaps only two countries, the US and UK did not have much trouble with the whole triad.

We have already mentioned that Prestige Points in the game are not money, but mean "HQ's willingness to provide you with appropriate weapons".
This willingness consists of the "Finance-Production-Logistics" triad.

Therefore, regardless of how much each particular country's armament and ammo cost in monetary terms at the official price tag, I assume a ratio of the cost of conventionally identical Ground units, as measured by "Willingness to Provide", and, accordingly, the cost in PP:

Cost of Ground units:
USA, UK: 1.0 (exemplary military industry)
GE, USSR: 2.0 (military industry with problems)
Japan: 4.0 (deficient war industry)

One etalon unit is selected, and its value is used to calculate the value of similar units from other countries.
On a battalion scale the cost is irrelevant. It is subordinate to the objectives of the scenario.
It only makes sense to talk about unit costs at the division scale.

AMMO for Ground units:
USA, UK: 2.0 (model industry and logistics)
GE: 1.5
USSR: 1.0
Japan: 0.5 (?)

The AMMO limitations are the same for both the short Battalion Campaign or single scenario and the long Division Campaign.

Naturally, air and naval units for the five major countries must be considered separately.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] ATY Calculator (6), INF, ATG, TANKS

Post by Lettos »

This post applies equally to the ATY Calculator (1-5), and also to the other major ground forces.

The vast majority of modders, hobbyists, and players of SSI Empire products have played and... unfortunately, they learned WW2 combat tactics on the same SSI products while playing. I too have sinned with this superficial approach. But lately I took some steps to remedy the situation.

When creating our games, SSI consulted a competent military tactician and theorist.
Who, in turn, was not born with this knowledge, but acquired it from the practice and books of other practitioners.

I highly recommend a book that should be read before doing any tactical modding, i.e. creating battalion scenarios and campaigns, more or less professionally.
At the divisional scale, the information on the use of various weapons will also come in handy!

Middeldorf E. Taktik Im Russlandfeldzug Erfahrungen Und Folgerungen. E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1956.

1) You can buy the book for 100-150 Euro. It became a rarity long time ago.
2) The book can be found in the library (not very convenient, not very efficient. However, humanity somehow evolved for 200 years, using exactly this kind of access to information)
3) The book can be fired with shells from the powerful gun of the auto-translator. Approximately 90% hits are guaranteed :)
Link to the Russian edition:
http://militera.lib.ru/h/middeldorf/index.html

Below I will give some of the most informative quotes from the book, which I have divided by type of weapon (translated by DEEPL):
TANKS

Russian tanks used as self-propelled artillery were particularly unpleasant. In this case they acted suddenly and destroyed one firing point after another by direct fire, often firing from a great distance and skillfully using natural cover.
====
Tanks are a weapon that combines the basic attributes of the three military branches. This conclusion stems from an analysis of the tank's combat characteristics.
Compared to an infantryman, a tank is able to attack faster and with greater effect, while remaining a "mobile field fortification. However, a tank is defenseless if, acting without infantry support, it encounters modern infantry anti-tank weapons.
A tank, like an artilleryman, can destroy infantry targets and the defender's anti-tank weapons. However, it has a very limited amount of ammunition, which is difficult to replenish as it advances quickly into the enemy's depth of defense.
Finally, a tank can, like an anti-tank, destroy the defender's tanks and self-propelled artillery, but it is a large target that attracts the attention of all its opponents, including enemy aviation.
TANKS and ATG

... Russian command, of course, could allow some neglect of anti-tank defense, at least in the matter of anti-tank production, since the most effective means against tanks was tanks.

This was not the case on the German side. On the Eastern Front during the four years of the war there were on average about 30 tank and motorized divisions and 120-140 infantry divisions. If even tank formations encountered great difficulties in repelling Russian massive tank attacks, then there is nothing to say about the infantry divisions, which during all the years of the Russian campaign experienced an acute shortage of anti-tank means.

In evaluating this negative experience of antitank defense in the military literature of the postwar period one often comes to the conclusion expressed by one American division commander, who stated, "World War II seems to have shown that you need a tank to fight a tank."

Undoubtedly, the tank is the most effective anti-tank weapon. However, the question arises: Is it the best tool in all cases?

When attacking an enemy who has a significant advantage in tanks, the tank is the only possible means of success. However World War II showed that armies, forced to strategic defense, pay off bitterly if they do not have a powerful anti-tank defense together with armored forces.

The issue of antitank defense becomes especially acute when one tank has to fight against ten or more enemy tanks. But such a quantitative mismatch, although it will be temporary, may arise not only in the period of strategic defense, but also at any stage of modern combat operations. Therefore to transfer to the armored forces all the tasks of antitank defense would mean dispersal of forces of the most valuable kind of troops. It would be a major mistake to spend such an expensive fighting tool as a tank to counter enemy tanks. An army that does not have enough anti-tank weapons and, therefore, is forced to use its own tanks to protect its infantry against enemy tanks, will inevitably face the need to disperse its tank force. Consequently, such a solution to the problem of antitank defense would place a heavy burden on the branch of the army designed to ensure victory.

The experience of World War II teaches that antitank weapons must be so cheap that they can be mass produced without a particularly heavy burden on military capabilities. At the same time, they must be so light that they can be used en masse by all branches of the armed forces.
Towed ATG.

The first prewar examples of 37mm and 50mm mechanically-powered anti-tank guns met the requirements of the time for armor penetration, range, weight, and dimensions. By the beginning of the war, however, the development of tanks had outpaced the development of anti-tank guns. Increased armor thickness and improved tank shape steered the development of anti-tank guns down a path that ended in a dead end. The increase in caliber from 37 mm to 88 mm led to an increase in the weight of the gun from 0.5 to 4.5 tons. As a result, the anti-tank gun became tactically unusable.

Increasing the muzzle velocity of the projectile to increase armor penetration and improve accuracy led to lengthening the barrel from 1.5 to 6.5 m. This also had a negative effect on the tactical suitability of the gun.

The creation of cumulative ammunition necessitated a reduction in the muzzle velocity of the projectile. This, in turn, led to a decrease in accuracy. In addition, anti-tank guns, which had no armor-piercing means of propulsion, could hardly move close to the front line. Bringing the guns to a firing position was time-consuming. A large firing squad was needed with the gun, which was forced to fight without armor protection. The experience of the Second World War showed clearly that conventional anti-tank guns on mechanical traction could no longer keep up with the further development of tanks. They in no way meet the requirements of modern maneuver warfare and therefore cannot be in service with modern troops.
AD and field ATY guns

In peacetime, field artillery in the armies of all countries, with the exception of Russia, had little or no training for the task of fighting tanks. In Russia, on the contrary, anti-tank defense was in the hands of artillerymen.

In Germany, with the withdrawal of the 75-mm field gun and the introduction of the 105-mm light field howitzer in its place, a decisive step was taken that ruled out the direct use of field artillery against tanks. The adoption of shaped charge shells provided artillery in closed firing positions with a more reliable means of self-defense. Because of this, artillery often had considerable success in direct fire on tanks. Indirect fire on tanks cannot play a decisive role in antitank defense. When repelling enemy tank attacks, the main task of artillery firing from enclosed firing positions is to cut off infantry from tanks and create favorable conditions for destroying the latter with close-range weapons.

The 88-mm antiaircraft gun, which had sufficient fire accuracy and high armor penetration, proved itself as a good anti-tank weapon even when firing at long ranges. However, because of its big dimensions it could fight tanks at the range of 1000 m or more, which is possible only on the open plains. Otherwise this gun is characterized by everything that was said above about the antitank gun on mechanical traction.
Self-propelled ATG

Self-propelled anti-tank gun, assault gun and self-propelled anti-tank gun

The self-propelled anti-tank gun is a conventional anti-tank gun mounted on a tank chassis with anti-shattering frontal and side armor and a small horizontal firing angle. When enemy tanks appeared en masse on the battlefield and engaged in sustained tank combat, these very tall, poorly armored and sedentary vehicles found themselves in a difficult position in most cases.

The assault gun and the self-propelled anti-tank gun are fully armored, top-covered, all-terrain vehicles with thick frontal armor and a powerful cannon. Unlike a tank, they do not have a rotating turret. These vehicles have proven themselves as a mobile fighting vehicle, used both in defense and offensive in decisive directions. Their disadvantages are that they have a low angle of horizontal fire and are vulnerable in close combat. Since both assault and self-propelled anti-tank guns are hardly cheaper than tanks in terms of metal consumption and manufacturing costs, it was not possible to eliminate the quantitative superiority of the enemy in armored vehicles at their expense during the war. In spite of all the successes, these fighting vehicles were too little to make a decisive improvement in the anti-tank defense of the troops. The main disadvantage of these combat vehicles was that they were not a cheap mass anti-tank weapon.
ATG in defense

When determining the required number of anti-tank weapons, the width of the normal defense front of the unit or unit and the number of tanks that the enemy can use in a given area should be taken into account.

If we assume that under the terrain conditions typical for the European theater, antitank guns can shoot at tanks at ranges of up to 500-700 m on average and that it is necessary to provide no less than three-layer fire to be achieved by mutual flanking and echelon layout of guns in depth, then the minimum requirement for troops would be about 20 antitank guns per 1 km of front. It should be taken into account that the requirement in this case is for antitank guns with a limited horizontal sector of fire. This means that in the band of each division occupying the defense front of 10 km there should be 200 antitank guns. On the other hand, if the number of enemy tanks is taken as the basis, then of course it is necessary to take the average, not the highest figure. Saturating the troops with anti-tank weapons to the point where they could repel any tank attack with their own forces contradicts the principle of simple troop control. If this path is followed, then hundreds of anti-tank guns will stand unused on the sections of the front not attacked by tanks, while on the directions where the enemy is making massive tank attacks, there will be a shortage of these guns.

On the basis of the experience of the last two years of the war we should consider an offensive with a tactical density of 200 tanks per 1 km of the front, and a "normal offensive" - an offensive by three infantry divisions with about 200 to 250 tanks for a total offensive front width of 10 km. 200 to 250 enemy tanks in this case would be opposed by 200 anti-tank guns and about 70 to 80 tanks. Such a ratio between attacking tanks and antitank weapons has been sufficient in all successful defensive battles on the Eastern Front.

Antitank guns are a relatively cheap mass-produced anti-tank weapon, so it is necessary to continue to produce them in the required quantity. However, the cost of an anti-tank gun should not exceed 5 percent of the cost of a tank. It must be remembered, however, that any savings by reducing the number of anti-tank guns is an unacceptable mistake.

================
Direct fire at a range of more than 1,000 m is very difficult in Central European terrain. In most terrain conditions, the practical range of direct fire will be considerably less.
Breakthrough of anti-tank lines

One of the peculiarities of Russian defense was the creation of anti-tank lines. This feature, which was not reflected in Russian charters, became characteristic in the second half of the war. It showed a tendency to concentrate anti-tank guns together with field and antiaircraft guns on the most important directions in the depth of defense and to avoid using them alone. This is a typical example of how quickly the Russian command generalized combat experience and immediately made it available to its troops.

The core of the anti-tank defense at the most important sites often consisted of trenched tanks. The anti-tank line often ran not in parallel but at some angle to the front line or in a strongly concave arc. This arrangement of the anti-tank line made it possible to encircle the advancing tanks from the flanks or lure them into the so-called "fire bag" and then open a surprise fire on them from three sides. The guns were usually in cover and well camouflaged from aerial and ground surveillance. The guns were rolled out of their shelters for firing, which was usually at short ranges. Often false positions were used, where carelessly camouflaged pieces of pipes or tree trunks gave the impression of guns. The anti-tank lines were covered by infantry in the depths of the defense.

The anti-tank lines were usually created in stable sections of the defense front, but the Russians knew how to create them during maneuvering combat as well. Therefore troops had to be in constant readiness to break through such lines.

The experience of breaking through anti-tank lines showed that massive fire of guns of all calibers usually could not suppress or destroy anti-tank weapons located on them. Air strikes are also ineffective in the majority of cases because the anti-tank lines are well camouflaged. When it is not possible to bypass an anti-tank line, then infantry must be used to overcome it. If tanks with motorized infantry or infantry with assault guns unexpectedly encounter enemy anti-tank lines during an attack, then the offensive must be temporarily suspended and then resumed. In this case the tanks (assault guns) under the order of the commanding officer under the cover of smokescreen retreat to a distance greater than the direct firing range of the enemy anti-tank guns. Reconnaissance tank platoons and dismounted motorized infantry conduct thorough reconnaissance and observation. False attacks are conducted as necessary to reveal the enemy's system of fire. In doing so, it is especially important to establish the extent and flanks of anti-tank lines, areas of terrain advantageous for conducting flank attacks, as well as the firing positions of anti-tank guns and anti-tank blast obstacles. Some infantry or motorized infantry units attack from the front, and the main forces strike on the flank of the anti-tank line. The infantry's actions are supported by tank and assault artillery fire.
ATY

As the experience of major defensive battles in the East has shown, the effect of artillery fire becomes crucial in modern defense. Artillery must open fire as soon as enemy preparations for an offensive are detected. The suppression of the enemy at the starting positions by means of the powerful "fire blows" was extremely effective in all major battles held on the Eastern front during the period 1943 to 1945. Consumption of ammunition during fire attacks often exceeded the consumption of ammunition on the first day of the offensive. According to the statements of prisoners, the casualties at that time were much higher than during the attack itself. Thanks to powerful fire strikes on the troops concentrated in the initial positions, many Russian offensive operations were thwarted.

===========
The task of modern defense is primarily to repel enemy attacks with fire of all kinds of weapons. This can be achieved only when fire assets are concentrated in time and a surprise fire strike against the enemy is ensured. Characteristic of most of the unsuccessful attacks during the last war was that they were repelled 200-400 m in front of the front line. Artillery fire was decisive. But even powerful concentrated artillery fire has only an overwhelming rather than destructive effect on the enemy. Combat experience, especially the experience of the last years of the war, showed that it is not enough to cut off the enemy tanks from the accompanying infantry only. In modern conditions it is necessary to require simultaneous destruction by concentrated fire of all fire weapons of both tanks and infantry at the same line. Any other solution would mean dispersal of fire, and with it a weakening of the defense.

===========

The main task of artillery is to cut off the advancing infantry from the tanks by intense fire. In doing so, it is necessary not only to force the infantry to lie down, but also to force them to refuse to take any active action against forward strongholds and tank fighters. Then artillery destroys the enemy infantry with concentrated fire.

Artillery can provide a strong moral force and inflict heavy material losses on the enemy at a time when his tanks are in their original positions and concentrated to go on the offensive.

The fight against the enemy's artillery should not stop even during the attack of his tanks. The peculiarity of the Russian offensive, which consists in providing tanks and infantry with direct artillery support even while they are engaged in close combat, must first of all be answered by suppressing their artillery.
Hmm... Direct fire range is 1000 meters.

I've said somewhere on this forum that PG1 looks like it's only made for a believable desert game. The geographical realities of Central and Eastern Europe are very poorly modeled in the game. No camouflage, no dependence of Ranged fire accuracy on fire distance. In the desert you can model this way, but in rough, bocage, forests and mountains you can't.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] ATY Calculator (7) Summary for PGF

Post by Lettos »

ATY Calculator Parts (1-6) see above.

Summary

These are not definitive conclusions, but only tentative ones based on reflection and numerous experiments in the sandbox.
It is a line dictated by historical military logic. Deviations from this line for game purposes are possible. But it must be clearly understood from what, where, and in the name of what such deviation is made.

Scale

Depending on the selected Scale of the scenario (campaign) the Soft Attack, Hard Attack, AMMO parameters of the same unit will be different.
The general rule: a smaller time equivalent of one turn requires smaller parameter values.

Classes

ATY >122mm should not have the ability to Indirect support fire.
It is optimal to move such guns to the existing Recon class. From now on I will call them ATY(R).

Ground Defense (GD)

The parameters must be within the range of values

ATY and ATY(R) = 1-2
ATG = 3-4

The larger the caliber of the gun, the smaller its GD must be.

Initiative (INI)

ATY and ATY(R) = 0-2

INF = more than ATY but less than ATG

For ATG 20-75mm : less by "1-2" than the INI parameter of a tank with the same caliber gun.
Large caliber ATGs: only in rare cases slightly more (up to +3) than the INI for the ATG 75mm, more often less (up to -2).

Movement type (MT)

Towed MT should be adjusted in EXE to make the movement more dependent on terrain and surface conditions.

Movement Allowance (MA)

ATY up to 80mm MA = 2
ATY 80-122mm MA = 1

ATY(R) >122mm MA = 0 (i.e. movement on game map is available only by transportation with Organic Transport)
MA=0 means the extreme vulnerability of large-caliber guns in a direct attack on them.

ATG up to 70mm MA = 2
ATG 70-80mm MA = 1
ATG > 80mm MA = 0

AMMO

For ATG, ATY
Up to 80mm = 4
80mm - 122mm = 3-4

ATY(R)
>152mm and less than 200mm = 2
>200mm = 1

ENT

ATY and ATG should have abilities to ENT less than INF but better than Tanks and Recons
ATY(R) ENT level should be equal to Recon Class 2.

Special abilities

ATY(R) will have bonus "Ignores Entrenchment".

Note: FORT Class should have "Target Type" = SOFT

Range

ATY:
Up to 100mm = 3-4
100-122mm howitzers = 5-6
100-122mm guns = up to 10

ATY(R)
152mm howitzers = 6-8
152mm guns = up to 12
Larger calibers = by decision of Scenario author

ATG
Up to 75mm = 0 (with some rare exceptions = 1)
> 75mm = 1

Soft Attack

Benchmark values for Battalion scale (using Calculator):

ATY
75mm = 6
105mm = 7

ATY(R) howitzers
152mm = 9

ATY(R) guns
> 152mm
SA value should be about 9 or even LESS due to because of very inaccurate shooting at long ranges.

ATG
SA should be very small, about 1-2-3-4

Hard attack

Some ATY 75-105mm should have a significant value of Hard Attack (with Range=0-1), but it should be implemented not in ATY unit but in Dual-Purpose transport only.

Without dual purpose transport Hard Attack for:

ATY = very low

Cost

ATY
Calibers > 122mm should be very expensive
Calibers > 152mm should be extremely expensive

ATG
Calibers > 75mm should be very expensive
Calibers 100mm and more should be extremely expensive

Dual-Purpose & Organic Transport

ATY

Some ATY units 75-105mm with the ability to quickly transfer from transport to firing position for direct fire must have a transport with a ATG parameters and Range = 0 or 1.
122mm - probably should be provided with any Organic transport only

ATY(R)

Should be provided with Organic transport ONLY.
It is desirable that the transport corresponds in its pulling capacity to the weight of the implement. Such a vehicle should cost considerably more than a conventional 3-ton truck.

ATG

Almost all ATG units up to 90mm must have a transport with a more or less weakened parameters of same ATG unit's.
This simulates a quick transfer of a unit from a transport position to a combat position (10-15 minutes) in which the unit is not camouflaged, has no pre-arranged firing sectors (not relevant to the desert), has a limited supply of projectiles, etc.
User avatar
HexCode
First Lieutenant
First Lieutenant
Posts: 923
Joined: 2019-09-30 18:54, Monday

[DEV] SSI's Spotting Ranges

Post by HexCode »

Intended Audience: # Lettos # & # Radoye #

I'm a bit curious...

SSI's PG1 / AG content features the following unit spotting range (SpR) values:

a) Air and Naval Transports: ONE
Shouldn't they be ZERO instead ?

b) Towable Anti-Tanks : TWO & SPATs: ONE
Shouldn't it be the other way around ?

c) Structures (e.g., Forts and Strongpoints): FOUR
I would have given Forts TWO and Strongpoints ONE.

d) Heavy Weapons Infantry: TWO
Why not just ONE ?

All learned interpretations are welcome ! :)
Last edited by HexCode on 2024-02-13 05:05, Tuesday, edited 1 time in total.
User avatar
Radoye
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Posts: 472
Joined: 2019-09-30 11:21, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Radoye »

I'm not sure, been a long time since i experimented with this, but if i remember it right there's no 0 spotting, it behaves just like 1 spotting.
User avatar
HexCode
First Lieutenant
First Lieutenant
Posts: 923
Joined: 2019-09-30 18:54, Monday

[DEV] Unit Spotting Range Zero

Post by HexCode »

:howdy Radoye,
Radoye wrote: 2022-01-13 13:32, Thursday... if i remember it right there's no 0 spotting, it behaves just like 1 spotting.
Most probably you're thinking of Shooting Range (ShR).

Under fair atmospheric conditions, a unit sporting SpR value ZERO (0) only scouts the hexes it actually occupies or traverses while moving, and nothing else. However, there're some intriguing complications here as well ! :evil :)

So, yeah, such a friendly unit may find itself sitting next to an enemy unit without spotting it ! ;)
Last edited by HexCode on 2024-02-13 05:05, Tuesday, edited 1 time in total.
User avatar
HexCode
First Lieutenant
First Lieutenant
Posts: 923
Joined: 2019-09-30 18:54, Monday

[DEV] Infantry Close Defense Values

Post by HexCode »

:howdy Cat Leon,

Elsewhere in this forum:
Cat Leon wrote: 2022-01-15 07:12, SaturdayWhy all the infantry units have Close Defense of zero? When infantry units fight each other in city, in forest or mountain terrain they use Close Defense. The same thing happens if only one of infantry units is in close terrain. Both infantry units use Close Defense anyway! But as Close Defense is zero, any defense is practically absent in this case. I think it would be more correct to add at least minimal Close Defense for the units of infantry class (maybe except cavalry)! What do you think?
Because of the underlying combat outcomes determination formulas, the opposing Close Defense values do NOT cancel one another out. Rather, they solely impact the units' Defense Grade values. Increasing Close Defense values will result in fewer casualties all around. It's up to individual content designers to decide whether this or that Close Defense value is "historically justifiable".
Last edited by HexCode on 2024-02-13 05:06, Tuesday, edited 1 time in total.
User avatar
Cat Leon
Major
Major
Posts: 100
Joined: 2019-12-17 10:16, Tuesday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Cat Leon »

In other words, nothing prevents you to increase "Close Defence" in your Efile. Obviously, infantry losses will be slightly lower in this case.
PS: I have removed my post in "Ephemeral" Posts" topic.
Leon, the friendly cat who walks by himself, plays PGF, PG2 & OG and bores busy people!
User avatar
Cat Leon
Major
Major
Posts: 100
Joined: 2019-12-17 10:16, Tuesday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Cat Leon »

If fortifications are soft targets in the Efile you have to remember not only about their 'Ground Defence' but also about 'Close Defence'! The point is an infantry always attacks 'Close Defence' of a fortifications. Since infantry 'soft attack' is higher than 'hard atack', 'Close Defence' of fortifications should also be increased! BTW. The good idea to make fortifications 'soft targets' is already quite old. As far as I remember Adler was the first who have suggested and maked it in his PG2 Efile!

Deprive heavy guns of 'Support fire' ability by moving these guns to 'Recon class' is also good idea for PGF. It would be possible to move them in 'AT class' for example but in this case they fire last. In 'Recon class' they fire first! However they will be available for purchase among other units of 'Recon class' in the game that looks pretty strange for a gamer... :wink
Leon, the friendly cat who walks by himself, plays PGF, PG2 & OG and bores busy people!
User avatar
HexCode
First Lieutenant
First Lieutenant
Posts: 923
Joined: 2019-09-30 18:54, Monday

[DEV] Exploratory Experimentation

Post by HexCode »

:howdy Cat Leon

The below isn't in any way "historical" but rather play system specific.
Cat Leon wrote: 2022-01-24 13:06, Monday... an infantry always attacks the 'Close Defense' of fortifications
Yes ! This is the case irrespective of the underlying terrain type on which the Structure Class unit is sitting; NOT just on City / Port / Forest / Mountain terrain.
Cat Leon wrote: 2022-01-24 13:06, MondayIf fortifications are soft targets in the Efile you have to remember not only about their 'Ground Defense' but also about their 'Close Defense'! ... Since infantry 'soft attack' is higher than 'hard attack', 'Close Defence' of fortifications should also be increased!
The Library already recommends that this be done in all instances where stationary (i.e., Movement Allowance value ZERO) units such as "garrison" ones are assigned to the Structure Class (thereby rendering them incapable of retreating).
Cat Leon wrote: 2022-01-24 13:06, MondayDeprive heavy guns of 'Support fire' ability by moving these guns to...
Yes ! By assigning them to a class other than Artillery, they'll no longer be able to provide Indirect, Defensive Fire.
Cat Leon wrote: 2022-01-24 13:06, MondayIt would be possible to move them to the 'AT class' for example but in this case they fire last.
This restriction only applies to initiating attacks against Tank / Recon Class targets. In any case, given that the heavy guns would still be engaging in Ranged Attacks (right ?), this shouldn't be a problem, should it ? I mean, the targets of such Ranged Attacks can't return fire anyway.
Last edited by HexCode on 2024-02-13 05:07, Tuesday, edited 2 times in total.
User avatar
Cat Leon
Major
Major
Posts: 100
Joined: 2019-12-17 10:16, Tuesday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Cat Leon »

The idea to use 'ignore entrenchment' ability by long-range and heavy guns is questionable for me :notsure ! This feature is more suitable for rocket artillery...
Leon, the friendly cat who walks by himself, plays PGF, PG2 & OG and bores busy people!
User avatar
Cat Leon
Major
Major
Posts: 100
Joined: 2019-12-17 10:16, Tuesday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Cat Leon »

When playing Spanish campaigns from PGF complete.zip I paid attention to 'Pontoon Bridge' units for republicans in 037.pgscn (Ebro). The point is these units are placed in 'Ocean' hexes and moreover they don't have 'Bridge' ability! So they could not work as a bridges even on 'River' hexes! Can anyone look at 037.pgscn (Ebro) and explain me the idea of using these 'Pontoon Bridge' units? For decoration and variety? :huh
Spanish campaigns are in PGF complete.zip ( https://sites.google.com/site/panzergen ... enter/home ).
Leon, the friendly cat who walks by himself, plays PGF, PG2 & OG and bores busy people!
User avatar
Radoye
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Posts: 472
Joined: 2019-09-30 11:21, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Radoye »

I believe these are conversions from custom AG campaigns, if someone has access to the original version they could review what is going on there. Sometimes the automated conversion process from PG / AG to PGF (be it using PGF's own built-in functionality or external FPGE editor) can produce suboptimal results...

Have you tried to add bridging ability to these units in the eqp file and see if it makes any difference? I mean, it does sound like a bug if such an unit doesn't have the ability to bridge anyway...
User avatar
Cat Leon
Major
Major
Posts: 100
Joined: 2019-12-17 10:16, Tuesday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Cat Leon »

Radoye wrote: 2022-05-23 15:43, Monday Have you tried to add bridging ability to these units in the eqp file and see if it makes any difference? I mean, it does sound like a bug if such an unit doesn't have the ability to bridge anyway...
Yes, of course. It works as bridge with 'Bridge' ability but only on 'River' hexes! And it is still useless on 'Ocean' hexes in PGF... ;)
Leon, the friendly cat who walks by himself, plays PGF, PG2 & OG and bores busy people!
User avatar
HexCode
First Lieutenant
First Lieutenant
Posts: 923
Joined: 2019-09-30 18:54, Monday

[DEV] "Fording" Bodies of Water

Post by HexCode »

Intended Audience: # Lettos # & # Radoye #

In PGF-SSI, underlying river terrain can be permanently bridged via the presence of underlying roadwork. Temporarily, ground units possessing bridging capabilities can also serve as bridges for the benefit of other ground units aligned with the very same Side etc.

In PGF-CDP, underlying body of water terrain (e.g., Ocean, Sea, Coast, Lake) can be permanently "forded" via the presence of underlying roadwork. No unit can do so, even on a temporary basis.

Iconic representations are purely cosmetic and, hence, irrelevant to the play system.
Last edited by HexCode on 2024-02-13 05:08, Tuesday, edited 1 time in total.
User avatar
Radoye
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Posts: 472
Joined: 2019-09-30 11:21, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Radoye »

Ah OK so then there's supposed to be a "road" over that Ocean hex and a friendly pontoon bridge unit is there just as eye candy, but it in fact does nothing...
User avatar
HexCode
First Lieutenant
First Lieutenant
Posts: 923
Joined: 2019-09-30 18:54, Monday

[DEV] Re: "Fording" Bodies of Water

Post by HexCode »

:howdy Radoye
Radoye wrote: 2022-05-24 12:41, Tuesday... there's supposed to be a "road" over that Ocean hex and a friendly pontoon bridge unit is there just as eye candy, but in fact it does nothing...
Yes ! :) In somewhat more explicit terms, barring its potential elimination, such a friendly / aligned pontoon bridge unit blocks enemy units from taking advantage of the underlying "fording" roadwork themselves.

This is PGF-CDP technical territory chock-full of nuances, of course. :bonk For example, ground units finding themselves on empty "forded" body of water hexes can neither be mounted onto their organic transports nor be dismounted from them. Mind you, this sort of thing isn't that unexpected.

[ADV] Muddy Bridge Nuances
viewtopic.php?f=95&t=470&start=50#p13891

describes a conceptually similar behavior observed in "plain vanilla" PGF-SSI territory.
Last edited by HexCode on 2024-02-13 05:09, Tuesday, edited 1 time in total.
User avatar
Cat Leon
Major
Major
Posts: 100
Joined: 2019-12-17 10:16, Tuesday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Cat Leon »

I think there is a way to outwit the game in case of need! For example it's possible to set terrain type to 'River' for wanted hexes in STM file without changing tiles for same hexes in SET file. Then these hexes will have river's properties but look as ocean... ;)
Leon, the friendly cat who walks by himself, plays PGF, PG2 & OG and bores busy people!
User avatar
Cat Leon
Major
Major
Posts: 100
Joined: 2019-12-17 10:16, Tuesday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Cat Leon »

The idea works well!
1. Save Map*.set in separate folder.
2. Open a scenario in PGF editor.
3. Choose any of 'River' tiles and change wanted 'Ocean' hexes on the map.
4. Then Tools->Generate layers->Terrain type IDs (check box)->'Generate' button
5. Save scenario.
6 Now put old Map*.set back to campaign folder.
That's all! Now pontoon bridges through 'Ocean' hexes work! Procedure takes a few minutes... :P
Leon, the friendly cat who walks by himself, plays PGF, PG2 & OG and bores busy people!
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios - Air War

Post by Lettos »

Referring to viewtopic.php?f=95&t=467#p7294 and based on the same principles, I want to touch a bit on Air war in PGF.

1) Steve McGuba in the excellent KUK guide on page 15 has written a good program thesis. "- Airplanes have much less ammo - reconnaissance planes can attack 1-3 times, fighters can attack 2-4 times. (Idea adopted from Kaiser General)"
Many people have thought about it, including myself.
As a result, I made all Air units AMMO=3. This was done not only for the sake of historical truth, but also having a good understanding of the internal mechanics of AI decision making in Air war.
2) Item 1 is related to FUEL. Many people have thought about how to make air units return to their airfield more often. For AI units, due to the internal mechanics of PGF AI, this is rarely, but still possible. For player units, yes, definitely possible. In WiH, FUEL is reduced to values that, strangely enough, as a result of using proprietary formulas, surprisingly almost exactly the same as the original FUEL values in PG. Loop.
First the modders changed the FUEL values, then the PGF author made additional changes, and the result was strange FUEL values. Now there has been a reasonable, meaningful return to the original state. The formulas include cruising speed, practical range (not combat radius!).
3) Level bombers SA and HA. As a result of the discussions, three different people came to the same conclusion in three different ways: instead of the PG/PGF standard of HA=4 SA=1, it should be SA=4 HA=1. By the way, the value of SA=4 is not carved in stone. It can be changed depending on the Bomb Payload. For example, 1000kg -> SA=2, 1500kg -> SA=3, 2000 - 4, and with non-linear increase. I put the Bombers Special parameter in direct dependence on the presence of bombsight Norden or Lotfe7. No sight on Level Bombers 1934-1939, so Bombers special = 10-15. There is a sight, so Bombers special = 25-30. For fancy LBs, at least "50", even "70".
4) The level bomber is a very powerful weapon. But it is only when the player is forced to save PP. A competent attack is to hit with LB, then, if necessary, ARTY, and only on the third step - with a ground unit.
If the player doesn't save PP, he doesn't need LB. You can hit immediately with TB and then finish with a tank, or you can even do without TB. The player can send Replacements to the affected unit on the next turn, and go back into combat.
My game religion does not welcome such moves :)
5) PG/PGF has uber-units. Overrated from the very beginning, since PG. One of them is the Ju 87. it became one of the "religious false idols". Actually, dive bombing is not that effective against competent experienced infantry. Yes, there will be casualties. But it won't destroy a unit in one hit. Dive bombing is most effective against a target that does not occupy a very large area on the ground. A ship, a bridge, a train, an artillery battery, a warehouse. But not infantry, which is spread over 5 square kilometers, in trenches, and not even a well-armored tank (it is difficult to affect it with a high-explosive bomb, if it does not hit the target exactly).
Plus, diving comes in many forms. The dive angles give different bomb dispersion. When bombing infantry it makes no sense for all 20-30 planes to dump their 250-500 kg bombs in one place, moreover, heavily smoky after the first approach to the target of the group leader. And the choice of targets independently by each aircraft of the group leads to inevitable inefficiency. If you bomb a ship - then yes, here the goal is clear to everyone, and the smoke will not interfere.
Therefore, WiH will and already has TBs that have more SA than dive bombers. And of course the SA and especially Naval Attack of dive bombers is bigger than that of normal TBs (level o partly diving) and a bit bigger than that of sturmovik (Hs 123, Il 2, Ba 65, Marauder).

In defining unit parameters, I try to understand their strengths and weaknesses, and move away from the generic uber-unit to units that are more specialized for their specific tasks. Aside from historical truth, the game becomes more diverse from this approach.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Lettos »

Download link is in first post in thread: viewtopic.php?f=95&t=467&p=7294#p7294

Copied from README file from downloadable zip-file

=================================================================
Preface

Many thanks to my friends Radoye and Hexcode from PGF Forum on viewforum.php?f=95 for ideas and сonstructive cooperation!
Special thanks to Hexcode for deep knowledges in executable file tabular segments !
Special thanks to Radoye for excellent SPAIN scenarios from his WAW Campaign!

(c) Lettos. Any information from this campaign can be used free of charge for the purpose of creating new PGForever content.
=================================================================

CAMPAIGN RULES, SETTINGS AND TWEAKS

=====

Campaign path:

MAGIC FIRE (MAJ/MIN) -> BADAJOZ (MAJ/MIN) -> BILBAO (MAJ/MIN) -> EBRO (MAJ/MIN) -> MADRID (MAJ/MIN) -> POLAND (MAJ/MIN) -> WARSAW (MAJ/MIN) -> Intermediate scenario -> LOW COUNTRIES (MAJ/MIN) -> FRANCE (MAJ/MIN) -> SOMERSET (MAJ only!) -> Player's choice (historical or ahistorical path)
-> Player's Ahistorical choice (NORTH AFRICA or GREECE) (in work!)
-> Player's historical choice (NORTH AFRICA or BALKANS) (in work!)

Whole Campaign has been tested with default PGF settings (AI=Advanced, both sides Prestige=100% and Experience=0, Weather, Supply and Hidden units are "ON").
In Scenarios BILBAO and EBRO seems only MIN victory is available.
All standalone scenarios has been tested too and fully playable for AXIS side.

=====

Scenarios data(units) and maps:

MAGIC FIRE, BADAJOZ, BILBAO, EBRO, MADRID: maps and units are taken from WAW by Radoye. Order of Battle and units are sligthly modified by Lettos.
POLAND, WARSAW, FRANCE: new more realistic "true" maps by Lettos. Order of Battle and units by Lettos.
LOW Countries: default map from PGF. Order of Battle and units by Lettos.
Somerset: scenario map, Order of Battle and units by Lettos.

====

Campaign Rules:

1) Playing this campaign requires adherence to the following rule: for some AD, ATY, Tank units, there are corresponding units in the Land Transport category. These units as transports make the main unit more relevant to its combat use in the history.

Created and tested: AD Flak 8.8 requires only Land Transport ATG 8.8 Henchel or later Sdkfz7, i.e. this is a so-called "Dual-purpose unit". As the main unit, this unit is the AD Flak. A secondary use, which has sometimes become the main use, is to use famous "Acht-acht" unit as a powerful anti-tank gun with fire range = 1.
Created: sIG15 auf Pz.IB. Main unit is ATY with Fire Range = 1, secondary use (emulated as unique land transport) is ATG (in other words, as far as the anti-tank gun can be described in this way, it is almost a "tank" with appropriate parameters and Fire range = 0). ATY mode have labeled by "A" letter in icon. "T" mean tank.
Created but not tested: StuGIIIB. Main unit is tank("T") with range = 0, secondary (land transport unit) is field artillery armored gun("A") with range = 1 and sure without ability to provide Support fire.

Introducing such units into a campaign requires the player to be appropriately disciplined in following the purchasing and upgrade rules choosing land transport. A judicious choice of appropriate transportation is the right choice!

2) Please choose only appropriate land transport for ATY and ATG. Large caliber heavy-weight ATY requires at least Henschel 33 (100-125 horsepowers) and not Opel-Blitz (73.5 hp) or Mercedes 3000L (74 hp). But it better and more realistic to provide for heavy guns something from available half-tracked transports.

=====

Settings:

A. EXE file has been modified.

The modification has affected the movement types, terrain ENT CAP, INI CAP.

All movement types (except Amphibious) have new modified values on the corresponding terrain.
1) TOWED is no longer a universal all-terrain movement type for guns. On the contrary, TOWED becomes the slowest and most awkward movement type.
For example, ARTY, ATG, AD and AA now have four movement types:
Light weight guns - LEG, MVT=2;
Medium-weight guns - Wheeled, MVT=2;
Heavy-weight - Towed MVT=2 (moving on "1" hex only on roads);
Super-heavy - Towed MVT=1 (this mean practically zero MVT).
2) All MVT Types used by any kind of vehicles now not allows them to move into mountains. WHEELED, TRACK, HALF-TRACK, ALL-TERRAIN vehicles and guns can cross rivers only using roads or bridges. Movement in forests and swamps is reduced or prohibited.
WHEELED can't move on Rough terrain too.
3) Unique AXIS "Bridge Engineers + SdKfz7" unit has been created. It can cross rivers in one turn.

B. Campaign settings: No free elite replacements.

C. Intermediate scenarios created for new unit purchasing and for upgrade and replacements for existing ones.

=====

Tweaks:

1) The amount of PP gained during the scenario has been reduced and is about some hundreds per scenario. Victory Hex is now worth 8 PP, other objectives = 4 PP. The costs of AI(Allied) units has been reduced. Your Prestige depends mainly on completing missions on time.

2) Infantry units since September 1939 can't have organic transport. You can upgrade them to motorized or armored infantry.

3) ATY and ATG Soft Attack, Hard Attack, Range and AMMO parameters for many units have been significantly changed. Large caliber ATY now have less AMMO.

4) Fighters, TacBombers and Level Bombers have AMMO=3. FUEL parameter is reduced. Radically changed AA, AD, GD, INI, and SA and HA for all bombers. "Bomber special" parameter for Level Bombers is tweaked.
For Air Defence and Anti-aircraft units AA reduced. AD, GD, HA, SA and INI tweaked. 75mm and 88mm AD guns now have Fire Range = 2, less calibers have range = 1. All 20mm AD units moved to Anti-aircraft class.

Special non-combat units ("Cloudy", "Rainy") are introduced to emulate replacements by event and for other air war tweaking purposes.

5) Soft Attack increased for Capital ships.

=============

Updated 2023-11-12: Small fixes. Supply button has been removed. SA increased for Monitor in Somerset scenario. README edited.
Updated 2023-11-14: README edited. Scenario 007 map improved.
Last edited by Lettos on 2023-11-14 05:59, Tuesday, edited 4 times in total.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Air warfare - Level Bombers

Post by Lettos »

Refers to [ADV] Torpedo bombers and AA Cruisers viewtopic.php?f=95&t=470&p=17481#p17481

Capital ships can be destroyed by tactical bombers and torpedo carriers. Then it's time to get rid of PG's strange legacy - Level Bomber's Naval Attack.
Wasn't that weirdly thought out - a Level Bomber attack can reduce a capital ship's AMMO and FUEL?

For example, Level Bomber EXP=3 STR=13 Naval Attack=1(One!) and Bomber Special=30 will attack Battleship EXP=2 STR=10 with AD=20. May be Battleship will lose maximum 1 STR. But FUEL and AMMO will be halved or even tripled down! It's kind of illogical because you can win the war in the Pacific with just "flying fortresses"!

It's mandatory to correct Naval Attack for Level Bombers, working on land targets with their classic carpet bombing. NA should be ZERO.

Next, I've tested Torpedo bombers and TacBombers against "new" Battleships and "old" Heavy cruisers.
For now seems works such parameters which should be tested more:
TorpBomber NA=22-24
TacBomber (Dive) NA=14-16
Battleship AD=20
Heavy Cruiser AD=10-12
User avatar
Radoye
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Posts: 472
Joined: 2019-09-30 11:21, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Radoye »

Alternatively, you could also try Level Bombers with "Bomber Special" = 1 (because 0 would give them active AA) and high NA stats to depict naval patrol bombers (FW 200 and such)...
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Lettos »

Radoye wrote: 2023-11-15 13:04, Wednesday Alternatively, you could also try Level Bombers with "Bomber Special" = 1 (because 0 would give them active AA) and high NA stats to depict naval patrol bombers (FW 200 and such)...
I've tried. Very sad results. In case if Bomber Special =1 FUEL and AMMO not reduces. But suppression of attacked ship is about 100%. It mean that Level Bomber attack allows during half-turn to attack Battleship with any naval unit without loses.

FW200 could have carried a one or couple tons of bombs... it's not exactly a patrol aircraft.
Radoye> (because 0 would give them active AA)
Live a hundred years and be surprised a hundred years! :shock :) I'll have to see if it can be applied in air warfare...
User avatar
Radoye
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Royal Navy Battlecruiser Sqn
Posts: 472
Joined: 2019-09-30 11:21, Monday

Re: [DEV] Historical OoB Scenarios

Post by Radoye »

Lettos wrote: 2023-11-15 15:03, Wednesday FW200 could have carried a one or couple tons of bombs... it's not exactly a patrol aircraft.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focke-Wulf_Fw_200_Condor
A Japanese request for a long-range maritime patrol aircraft led to military versions that saw service with the Luftwaffe as long-range reconnaissance and anti-shipping/maritime patrol bomber aircraft.
The RAF used Lend-Lease Fortresses and Liberators in similar role, for long range maritime reconnaissance and anti-shipping / anti ASW (or, in simple terms - maritime patrol) role. Also other heavies with dedicated maritime patrol variants like Wellington / Warwick, Lancaster... The US developed a dedicated maritime patrol variant of Liberator, the Privateer. That one could carry nearly 6 tons of bombs.
Lettos wrote: 2023-11-15 15:03, Wednesday
Radoye> (because 0 would give them active AA)
Live a hundred years and be surprised a hundred years! :shock :) I'll have to see if it can be applied in air warfare...
That's how it works for TB class. Did not test for LB. Hopefully it works :ihope
User avatar
HexCode
First Lieutenant
First Lieutenant
Posts: 923
Joined: 2019-09-30 18:54, Monday

[DEV] "Bomber Special" Nuances

Post by HexCode »

Intended Audience: # Lettos # & # Radoye #
Radoye wrote: 2023-11-15 13:04, WednesdayAlternatively, you could also try Level Bombers with "Bomber Special" = 1 (because 0 would give them active AA)
PGF's engine "interprets" such settings in very, very specific ways. :)

Strictly within the confines of this discussion (no strategic bombing of urban centers, ports and airfields), if the air unit's class is LB, its Listed Accuracy Rating (LAR) just specifies the degree to which the unit can inflict Carpet Bombing damage (i.e., Ammo / Fuel point losses and Persistent / Durable Suppression points) on the target enemy unit. It has nothing to do with air-to-air combat. All LB Class air units are restricted from initiating air-to-air combat, no matter what.

SO, a setting of ZERO (0) reduces (but not necessarily eliminates) the Carpet Bombing damage inflicted on the enemy unit. This is a terminologically and computationally demanding matter. Fortunately, the Library contains full documentation. BUT, one has to really go over the formulas... :eek :lol

A good starting point can be:

Carpet Bombing Details
viewtopic.php?f=100&t=543#p14526
Last edited by HexCode on 2024-02-13 05:10, Tuesday, edited 1 time in total.
Lettos
Kadet
Kadet
Posts: 468
Joined: 2020-10-12 15:43, Monday

Re: [DEV] Unit Сlasses - redesign

Post by Lettos »

Preamble

1) So, the results of the experiments made it possible to find out a clear order of movement of units under the guidance of AI.
It was also found that a FORT class can have an MVT greater than zero.

Details are explained here: [AI] Unit "Acting" Sequence
viewtopic.php?f=95&t=597#p17916
It was also found that when moving units of the same class, AI moves units with a lower MVT value first.

2) Numerous battles in stand-alone scenarios make it possible to draw an absolutely categorical conclusion: if a scenario is part of a Campaign (e.g. Player=AXIS, AI=ALLIED), then in any scenario of that Campaign played by a player for ALLIED, he will win a convincing victory over AI=AXIS.
AI has a straightforward logic that leads it to defeat. The more complex the scenario created for the flexible thinking player, the easier it is for the player to win the same scenario playing for the opposite side.

The class redesign aims to strengthen the AI. For the player, the redesign creates some minor inconveniences, which I assume can be tolerated for the sake of AI enhancement. At the same time, the player gets the opportunity to upgrade units of some classes more logically.

Main actions

1) Transfer AI Heavy Long-Range ARTY to FORT Class. AI will use these guns first, before all the other land units move. The player's infantry lose their bonus when attacking such units. AI Heavy Arty will not be able to entrenchment (however, such guns are quite difficult to install in a deep trench. Camouflage, alas, is not taken into account). AI Heavy ARTY without switching to transport mode will not be able to get replacements on all terrain types except city. I think this is more of a plus than a minus. Repairing such big guns in the field is technically quite difficult. You need workshops, or longer term than one turn. Sending new guns to a unit was hardly really feasible. They are very expensive items, and they were not produced in such quantities as light guns.
2) Transfer all Player's side Recons and AI heavy Recons to TANK Class. This expands the player's upgrade options. For AI, this transfer means something different - it will attack slower with heavy tanks first (MVT=4-5), then with light tanks(MVT=6-7), and only then with Recons(MVT=7-9). Player's ATG will get INI penalty if will attack heavy Recons.
3) Transfer light AI side Recons to INF Class. They will move after the infantry and have a better chance of surviving at least 2-3 turns. The ENT value for such light and small Recons can be interpreted as the ability to camouflage on terrain. They are not buried in the ground, but are difficult to detect in ditches and bushes.

Thus, the RECON class is completely unit free.

4) Transfer Player's Assault guns to TANK Class.. To give you an example, it's a STUGIII, but not a Hummel (which was and still is in the ARTY class). The player gets to develop their initial tanks into both Tanks and Assault Guns. Creating Dual-Purpose units in general solves the problem a priori.
5) Transfer AI Assault guns to RECON Class. They will attack after Heavy ARTY and before the tanks attack. Most AI units in this class will be Dual-purpose (Assault gun as artillery + anti-tank or tank / ranged or not-ranged), with the ability to attack both before and after movement. These changes do not affect self-propelled artillery, which remains in the ATY class.
6) Transfer AI armored ATG to TANK Class.

7) Changes in UI: "Recon" -> "Assault guns" or "EMPTY" or remove button (Player will not use it). Change "Recon" in EXE to "AGuns" or something similar so that when you click on an AI unit you can see its purpose.

Additional actions

A few changes that are logically related to class conversions and AI logic in combat, but are not urgent or mandatory.

1) Transfer Player's armored ATG to TANK Class. Pros & Cons.
Pros: The player has no headache about the INI penalty when attacking AI tanks with their powerful armored units.The player does not suffer huge ATG unit losses in early scenarios; the player must endure those losses for the opportunity to make an upgrade sometime late in the campaign to something very powerful. Incidentally, that very powerful thing will also suffer large unnecessary losses when initiating an attack on an AI tank.
Cons: It makes no sense for a player to include a CORE towed ATG.
2) Reconnaissance
AI does a lot of stupid things because it can't see your units. AI is not trained to look at your units. Everything happens chaotically, in fact - flew in, saw, the next unit will attack what the first unit saw, and so on. A kind of chain reaction.
Create Air recon AI units to let him look at you from sky! The Aerial Reconnaissance aircraft must be in Tac Bomber Class, and have the lowest MVT value of any Tac Bombers the AI has on the map. Air Recon will move first of all the AI Air units.
Create INF scout AI units to let him look at you from bushes! Yes, there are already cavalry or Recons. But cavalry or cyclists can't always be placed in a scenario (they just weren't there sometimes), and Recon and motorcyclists have another MVT TYPE. Of course the INF Scout has to live as long as possible, so it moves last of all INF units. To do this, its MVT should be larger than that of a normal non-motorized INF.
Just a side note: And also for reconnaissance AI and Player can use regular slow "obsolete" airplanes. The lower their speed, the lower they fly (in real life), the more they see. Their Spotting can be either 3 or 4. I don't think the Me-262 pilot saw as much on the ground during his flight as the Fi.156 Storch pilot.
3) Create Air Hunter AI units. It is a Tac Bomber with fighter parameters, increased EXP/INI, and has the lowest MVT value of all Tactical Bombers on the map at the AI's disposal. Air Hunter will move first of all the AI Tac Bombers and Fighters.
-------------

A long time ago, in 1998, Gerold Treitler in his 1939 campaign version 6.0 for Panzer General 1 already got rid of the Recon class with the following transfer:
RECON -> TANK
ATG -> RECON
And Gerold used the empty ATG class for the Storming Gun.

Gerold had his own reasons why he made this Class transfer. Maybe someone did the Unit Class migration before him. I don't know about that.
25 years later, the reasons why I decided to go this way are a bit different (and PGF is a bit different than Panzer General 1). Motives and actions are not so important in this case.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank my idea predecessor for being the pioneer of the Class change topic! :cool :howdy
Last edited by Lettos on 2024-01-15 15:20, Monday, edited 2 times in total.
Post Reply